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Introduction
The purpose of copyright is to encourage the creation and mass
dissemination of a wide variety of works. Until recently, most means
of mass dissemination required a significant capital investment.
Disseminators needed printing presses, trains or trucks, warehouses,
broadcast towers, or communications satellites. It made economic
sense to channel the lion's share of the proceeds of copyrights to the
publishers and distributors, and the law was designed to facilitate

that.1 Digital distribution raises the possibility of mass dissemination
without the assistance of professional distributors, via direct authorto-consumer and consumer-to-consumer dissemination. Digital
distribution, thus, invites us to reconsider the assumptions underlying
the conventional copyright model.

We are still in the early history of the networked digital
environment, but already we've seen experiments with both direct
and consumer-to-consumer distribution of works of authorship.
Direct author distribution-by itself-has not yet garnered a lot of
attention because the most publicized efforts have been less than
wholly successful.2 When direct author distribution is augmented by

consumer-to-consumer distribution, though, the combination has the
potential to revolutionize the distribution chain. That potential has
not escaped the attention of professional distributors. Consumer-toconsumer dissemination, especially in the form of peer-to-peer file
sharing, has been met with hostility and panic.3 Legislation pending in
1.

See

BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 75 (1966);

JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 104 (2001); see, e.g., American Geophysical

Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) ("the monopoly privileges conferred by
copyright protection and the potential financial rewards therefrom are not directly serving
to motivate authors to write individual articles; rather, they serve to motivate publishers to
produce journals, which provide the conventional and often exclusive means for
disseminating these individual articles").
2. Stephen King's The Plant has been the most famous example of the direct
distribution model. Stephen King promised to keep writing the novel so long as three
quarters of the individuals who downloaded each chapter paid a dollar for it. Initially, 76%
of the people who downloaded chapters paid. After 4 chapters, the percentage of paying
readers dropped to 46%, and King dropped the project. See M.J. Rose, Stephen King's
"Plant" Uprooted, WIREDNEWS, Nov. 28, 2000, at http://www.wired.com/news/culture/
0,1284,40356,00.html. While 46% probably exceeds the percentage of paying readers of a
typical work of King fiction published in book form (allowing for book borrowers, used
book purchasers, etc.), it fell below King's announced minimum.
3. It is not yet clear whether peer-to-peer file sharing of music recordings decreases
or increases sales of CDs. Compare Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of
File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis (March 2004), available at
http:/lwww.unc.edul-cigar/papersFileSharing-March2004.pdf (concluding that file sharing
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Congress seeks to deter consumers from engaging in peer-to-peer file
sharing.4 Meanwhile, representatives of the music, recording and film
industries have sued the purveyors of peer-to-peer file sharing
software,5 the Internet service providers who enable consumers to
trade files,6 and more than 5000 individual consumers accused of
making recorded music available to other consumers over the
Internet.
In this paper, I propose that we look for some of the answers to
the vexing problem of unauthorized exchange of music files on the
Internet in the wisdom intellectual property law has accumulated
about the protection and distribution of factual information. In
particular, I analyze the digital information resource that has
developed on the Internet, and suggest that what we should be trying
to achieve is an online musical smorgasbord of comparable breadth
and variety.
Ten years ago, an influential government task force proposed
enhancing the scope of intellectual property rights in the digital
environment as a device to encourage investment in the infrastructure
underlying a national digital network.8 As the task force explained,
the cost of constructing such a network was beyond the federal
government's ability to fund, and the construction would need to be
undertaken by the private sector. The private sector, however, would
be reluctant to invest its resources unless it saw profits to be made.
The network would be commercial only if large numbers of people
could be persuaded to subscribe to digital network services, which
would require a killer application to draw people online. In the view
of the task force, that application was the possibility consumers could
enjoy movies, music and other content on demand. Enhanced
does not reduce and may increase sales), with Stan Liebowitz, Will MP3 Downloads
Annihilate the Record Industry? The Evidence So Far (June 2003), available at
http://www.utdallas.edu/-liebowit/intprop/records.pdf (attributing decline in CD sales to
P2P file sharing). See also LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 68-73 (2004).
4. See H.R. 2572, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2517, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 4077,
108th Cong.,(2004); S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004).
5. See MGM v. Grokster, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004); A&M v. Napster, 239 F.3d
1004 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Aimster, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003)
6. See RIAA v. Verizon, 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
7. See RIAA, Recording Industry Begins Suing P2PFile Sharers Who Illegally Offer
Copyrighted Music Online, Sept. 8, 2003, at http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/
090803.asp; Jefferson Graham, Freeze! Drop the song! File-swappers targeted, USA
TODAY, October 8, 2004, at 3B.
8. See INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING
GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 7-17, 218-38 (1995).
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copyright protection would be needed to persuade the producers of
movies, music and other content to make the investment in making
their material available over the national digital network. In order to
create a viable online information and entertainment resource, the
task force concluded, the United States needed to promise the
distributors of copyrighted works a larger share of the copyright pieonly then would they invest the resources needed to develop digital
content that would be sufficiently compelling to convince ordinary
consumers to pay for Internet access.
With the benefit of hindsight, it's become clear that most of the
assumptions underlying that argument were wrong. Greatly expanded
copyright has not yet encouraged movies or music online-there is an
enormous variety of music and movies available over the Internet,
but the overwhelming majority of what's there is there over the
vehement objections of the content owners. Nonetheless, the network
has grown at an unbelievable rate. The killer application that fueled
the growth of the Internet wasn't digital movies, after all. Instead, it
was communication-email, chat, online forums and personal web
pages. It turns out that people want to communicate with one
another, and that they love to share. The information space that has
grown up on the World Wide Web is largely the result of anarchic
volunteerism-not to build the pipes, which have been constructed by
telephone and cable companies to meet consumer demand for
broadband Internet access,'0 but to supply the information that runs
through them. Anecdotal evidence indicates that at least for some
material, untamed digital sharing turns out to be a more efficient
method of distribution than either paid subscription or the sale of
conventional copies. If untamed anarchic digital sharing is a superior
distribution mechanism, or even a useful adjunct to conventional
distribution, we ought to encourage it rather than make it more
difficult.
Part I of this essay explores the burgeoning digital information
space that has grown up on the Internet in the last two decades. In
Part II, I review the legal obstacles preventing us from simply treating
digital music the way we treat digital information. Amendments to
the copyright law enacted over the past 30 years have erected legal
barriers to consumer-to-consumer distribution that make lawful

9. Id.; LITMAN, supra note 1, at 89-100.
10.

See, e.g., Jim Hu, Broadband Numbers Show Heightened Demand, CINET

NEWS.COM (October 31, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1034-5100321.html; Matt
Richtel, Fastand Furious: The Race to Wire America, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,2003, § 3 at 1.
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exchange of copyrighted material extremely difficult. Part III tells a
true story about my son's third grade classroom, and spends a brief
moment looking at his teacher's use of the resources she finds on the
Internet. Part IV suggests that we look to the digital information
space described in Part I as a model for crafting a solution to the
controversy over peer-to-peer file sharing, and reviews some of the
proposals made in recent copyright scholarship. Finally, Part V briefly
outlines a particular solution that is in some respects different from
those discussed earlier.
I.

Someone Knows What I Want to Know

Someone knows what I want to know. Someone has the
information I want. If I can find her, I can learn it from her. She will
share it with me.
Which came first, the computer or network television?"
I could try to find the answer in a reference book instead. On my
bookshelf, I have two editions of the Encyclopedia Britannica, one
published in 1989 and one assembled at a public library used-book
sale from individual volumes published in 1964 and 1966. I no longer
consult either of them with any frequency. In a jewel case somewhere
near my desk, I have a multimedia CD ROM version of the
Britannica that I received as a gift in 1998. I never look at it at all, and
haven't since the month that I received it. I used to buy an Almanac
each year to look up quick facts (what's the population of New
Zealand? 12 How old is Senator Barbara Mikulski?"), but between

11. Television, but not by much. Tom Genova's TV history site, at
http://www.tvhistory.tv/1941%20QF.htm, tells us that NBC began commercial broadcasts
in 1941. See also ERIK BARNOUW, TUBE OF PLENTY: THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN
TELEVISION 99-148 (rev. ed. 1982). According to Asaf Goldschmidt's and Atsushi
Akera's introduction to the University of Pennsylvania's special exhibition on John
Mauchley, at http://www.library.upenn.edu/special/gallery/mauchly/jwmintro.html, the
ENIAC computer came along in 1946. See also 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 641-42
(1989).
12. The 2003 Information Please/Time Almanac lists New Zealand's population at
3,908,037. TIME ALMANAC 2003 WITH INFORMATION PLEASE 828 (2002). The
government of New Zealand currently describes its population as "a diverse multi-cultural
population of 4 million people, the majority of whom are of British descent. New
Zealand's indigenous Maori make up around 14 percent of the population." See NZGO,
People and History, at http://www.purenz.com/index.cfmlpurenz-page/3DD63CE4-18FD402B-A74A-A4C7A7AF5630.html. The SNZ Pop Clock at http://www.stats.govt.nz/
estimates New Zealand's
domino/external/web/prod-serv.nsf/htmldocs/Pop+Clock
population on 11 October 2003 at 04:16:30 AM as 4,025,641.
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1994 and beginning work on this project, I didn't bother. I stopped
relying on these books as it became possible to find specific answers

to particular questions online, because the person or persons who
knew what I wanted to know had been generous enough to post the
answer where it was easy for me to find it. The search was quicker,
and commonly yielded more accurate information, than consulting
whatever reference books were handy.
Although the Internet's usefulness as an engine of commerce has
flowed and ebbed, its value as a repository of information has
continued to grow exponentially. What we used to class as trivia (and

therefore useless information) becomes a matchless resource when it
is combined with other trivia in searchable form. 4 Volunteers, most of
them amateurs, have collected an unimaginable variety of
information and are eager to share it with the world. What I want to
know may not be in any book on my shelf or in my university's
libraries. I can probably find it on the Internet in less than an hour.
What are sesame seeds?"5

Networked digital technology has transformed information and
the way that we interact with it. Digital information is extraordinarily
accessible. If I have a question, I don't need to make up an answer
that seems plausible, or reason out what it's likely to be. I don't need
to go to the library and ask the reference librarian if I can see the
library's only copy of a reference book that ought to have6 the answer.
I can just turn to my computer and look it up on the web.1
13. According to the Information Please/Time Almanac, Senator Mikulski was born
in 1936. INFORMATION PLEASE/TIME ALMANAC, supra note 12, at 45. See also, THE
POLITICAL GRAVEYARD

INDEX

To POLITICIANS

at http://politicalgraveyard.com/

bio/midkiff-milen.html ("Mikulski, Barbara Ann (b. 1936)-also known as Barbara A.
Mikulski-of Baltimore, Md. Born in Baltimore, Md., July 20, 1936. Democrat."). The
2001 World Almanac doesn't include that information, but will tell you that Colin Powell
was born in 1937. See WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2001 at 320 (2000).
14. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm,
112 Yale L.J. 369 (2003).
15.

See

SESAME,

PLANT

(PLANTS),

1UP

INFO

ENCYCLOPEDIA,

http://www.lupinfo.com/encyclopedia/S/sesame.html. ("Sesame was introduced by African
slaves to the U.S. South, where it sometimes becomes a weed. The sesame was once
credited with mystic powers.").
16. The conventional wisdom about information available on the Internet is that it
lacks the reliability of information printed on dead tree pulp. See infra text accompanying
footnotes 30-35. That's a plausible charge but not, I think, a true one. Much of information
on the web is garbage (as is much information in print) and seekers of truth have needed
to develop new skills to distinguish reliable digital information sources from the online
equivalent of the Weekly World News, but they have developed those skills remarkably
quickly. People who find things out for a living, like reporters and librarians, have
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Digital information, moreover, is shared. Ten, even five, years
ago, it was conventional to talk about the Internet as a tool for
disintermediation. Authors and musicians would be able to use digital
networks to send stuff directly to their readers and listeners.
(Remember Stephen King's The Plant?17) There's some of that.
People post content on their websites for the rest of the world to
view. Academics exchange drafts of scholarly papers that way, 8 and
independent musicians and composers make recordings of their work
available for sampling and download.' 9 But, while we've seen a small
but appreciable amount of direct distribution, there's even more
consumer-to-consumer distribution. The "blog" (or weblog) is an
increasingly popular art form in which people post ongoing, public,
hyperlinked diaries of things they find interesting and want to share.
21
Readers of the blogs write in to contribute their own comments.
Someone has the recording I want. If I can find her, she'll share it
with me. I can copy it and pass it on. Someone knows the answer to
my question. If I can locate her, she'll tell me. I can learn it and pass it
on. Someone has seen the source I want to consult. She can tell me
where to find it.

embraced the Internet as an invaluable research tool. See, e.g., Jeffrey Selingo, When a
Search Engine Isn't Enough, Call a Librarian,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2004, at G1.
17. See supranote 2.
18. See, e.g., Michael Froomkin's Home Page at http://personal.law.miami.edu/
-froomkin/
19. See, e.g., Rick Sowash: Composer and Author at http://www.sowash.com.
20. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, Building a Web Media Empire on a Daily Dose of
Fresh Links, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2003 at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2003/11/17/technology/17blog.html. I class the blog as an example of consumer-toconsumer distribution rather than direct distribution because a central feature of so many
blogs is the hyperlinked recommendation to other material. See LAWRENCE LESSIG,
FREE CULTURE 41 (2004). For a sample of the assortment of blogs currently posted in the
Web, see http://directory.google.com//top//computers/Internet/OnTheWeblWeblogs;
http://www.daypop.com; http://www.blogspot.com; http://new.blogger.com.
21. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Road to the White House: How grassroots blogs
are transformingpresidentialpolitics, WIRED 11.11, November, 2003, at 136.
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The most powerful engine driving this information space turns
out not to be money-at least if we're focusing on generating and
disseminating the content rather than constructing the hardware that
it moves through. What seems to be driving the explosive growth in
this information space is that people like to look things up, and they
want to share. This information economy is largely a gift economy.
The overwhelming majority of the information I'm talking about is
initially posted by volunteers. Many of them are amateurs, motivated
by enthusiasm for their topics, a desire to pass interesting stuff on,
and, perhaps, an interest in attention and the benefits it may bring.
When one is a volunteer, the time and effort one is willing to put into
contributing to the information space can seem limitless. Volunteers
move on, of course: they get bored, or broke, or caught up in other
things, but there seems to be an inexhaustible supply of new
volunteers to take their places, and, luckily, the new volunteers are
able to build on earlier volunteers' foundations.23 I potentially know
all of the information the other participants know. Their knowledge
can be my knowledge with a few clicks of a mouse. In return, I make

22.

I quote verbatim the text of two email messages:

Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2003 21:38:14 -0400
To: cyberprof list@uclink4.berkeley.edu
From: Jessica Litman <litman@mindspring.com>
Subject: Hamilton v. Microsoft
Has anyone seen a copy of the complaint in Hamilton v. Microsoft, the class
action suit filed in California recently seeking to hold Microsoft liable for the
vulnerability of its software?
Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2003 19:38:14 -0700
To: Jessica Litman <litman@mindspring.com>
From: Wendy Seltzer <wendy@seltzer.com>
Subject: Re: Hamilton v. Microsoft
Cc: cyberproflist@uclink4.berkeley.edu
I've put a copy up at <http://www.eff.org/-wseltzer/hamilton v microsoft.pdf>
Much as I dislike Microsoft's operating system and tactics, a class action blaming
the company for virus attacks and identity theft seems a heavy-handed way to
clean them up.
-Wendy
23. Volunteers also turn into entrepreneurs. Yahoo! and the Internet Movie
Database are businesses that began as content authored by volunteers and morphed into
commercial services. LITMAN, supra note 1, at 103-105.
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my knowledge available to anyone who happens by. Each of us can
draw on the information stores of the others."
The rate at which people have adopted the Internet as their
research tool of choice is astonishing. People find the easy availability
of all that information empowering. People want to know how old

Steven Spielberg is. They want to know the history of early radio.
They want to know what traveling musicians wore in 15th century
Europe. They want to know how to make Shaker Lemon Pie. They

want to know what the Constitution actually says. If it's quick and
easy to do so, they'll look it up. They enjoy discovering new stuff. The
system has been evolving as we watch: consumer-to-consumer
interaction is leading to more information, better information, and
more accessible information; more complete and deeper archives;

wider ranges of divergent sources.25 People appreciate the instant
gratification of learning answers in a moment. Probably more
important than the speed of the system, however, is its breadth and
depth. Because of the disparate contributions of a host of volunteers,

one can find information that would not appear in conventional
reference sources. 26
24. If you read a lot of science fiction, this model should feel familiar. A number of
authors have portrayed worlds in which characters are connected to a massive electronic
database, which they can query at will. See, e.g., FRANK HERBERT, DUNE (1965); JOAN
VINGE, THE SNOW QUEEN (1980). This is different. The World Wide Web is certainly not
a database in the conventional sense. The information has neither structure nor
organization. It has no index, no table of contents, and no hierarchy. The domain name
system supplies a hierarchy of location, but information is not organized in any analogous
fashion. Instead, the Internet gives me access to a fluid conglomeration of the items
millions of individuals have chosen to make publicly available. A variety of third party
search engines purport to index only a small portion of the web. See Louis Introna &
Helen Nissenbaum, Defining the Web: The Politics of Search Engines, 33 COMPUTER 54
(Jan. 2000). Rather than a giant database, this is the hive mind, where all members of the
species share one another's knowledge and experiences. See, e.g., ORSON SCOTT CARD,
ENDER'S GAME (1985); BARBARA HAMBLY, THE TIME OF THE DARK (1982); Robert A.

Heinlein, Methuselah's Children, reprinted in ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, THE PAST
THROUGH TOMORROW 655, 794-808 (1967); ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, THE PUPPET
MASTERS

(1951);

ROBERT

A. HEINLEIN,

STARSHIP TROOPERS

(1959);

FRANK

HERBERT, HELLSTROM'S HIVE (1974); NANcY KRESS, PROBABILITY MOON (2000);
Theodore Sturgeon, To Marry Medusa, reprinted in THEODORE STURGEON, THE
JOYOUS INVASIONS (1965). Books published during the cold war commonly portrayed
hive mind species as the enemy. Hive minders were thinly disguised communists, against
whom clever, independent capitalists always managed to prevail. See CARD, supra;
HEINLEIN, STARSHIP TROOPERS, supra;HERBERT, supra; STURGEON, supra. Frequently

insectoid, hive mind creatures possessed great superiority of knowledge, often balanced by
a deficit of creativity or ingenuity. See especially CARD, supra.
25. See, e.g., John Borland, et. al., Mother of Invention, CINET NEWS.cOM, Apr. 14,
2002, at http://news.com.com/2009-1032-995679.html.
26. See, e.g., infra notes 29, 66, 148, and 151, and accompanying text.
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Ten years ago, not only Washington, but the entire journalism
business believed that the burgeoning digital network (which went by
the name, back then, of the "National Information Infrastructure")
would develop into a 500 channel interactive television system, with

"interactive" meaning that it would incorporate a method for
ordering and charging purchases and receiving targeted advertising.27

There are a number of businesses out there that are continuing to try
to shove the Internet in that direction,' but it isn't yet anything like a
500 channel TV largely because of the way people have come to
interact with information.
What is "the fuct of Pepsiman"?2 9
Let's pause for a word from our friendly reference book
publishers. Speed and convenience are all very well, but doesn't
selecting the speediest research tool ignore the quality and reliability
of the information I retrieve? The Internet, after all, is an infamous
source of falsehood and untruth.3" Books and periodicals have editors
and fact checkers to screen out misinformation; websites need not. 1
The story, as stories often do, turns out to be more complicated.
The efforts of editors and fact checkers have apparently not, for
example, prevented periodicals from reprinting Internet untruths as if
they were fact.32 That should not be surprising. Many editors and fact
27. See LITMAN, supra note 1, at 89-90. See, e.g., Herbert 1. Schiller, Public way or
private road? The 'informationhighway,' THE NATION, July 12, 1993, at 64.
28. See Jessica Litman, Electronic Commerce and Free Speech, 1 ETHICS &
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 213 (1999).
29. PepsiMan is a promotional superhero featured in Japanese commercials for Pepsi
Cola. See Pepsinut, PepsiMan at http://www.pepsinut.com/PepsiMan.htm. The campaign
has spawned a Japanese-only Nintendo game and a variety of promotional toys. See id.
The "Fuct of PepsiMan" is a pepsi-scented PepsiMan action figure available in Japan and
in the occasional U.S. anime store.
See http://www.doctorhook.com/pepsiuniversecom/pmanaction.html; Francine's diary for
Nov. 14, 2000 at http://francine.diaryland.com/20001114.html.
30. See, e.g., Carl M. Cannon, The Real Computer Virus, AMER. JOURNALISM REV.,
April, 2001, at 28 ("Internet . . . has an unmatched capacity for distributing
misinformation"); Paul S. Piper, Better Read That Again, 8 SEARCHER, Sept. 1, 2000, at 40
("Misinformation on the Internet is, and always will be, a problem.").
31. See, e.g., Michael Ollove, Turning the Pages, BALT. SUN, Jan. 10, 2000, at 1E;
Fresh Air: David Talbot, FounderAnd Editor In Chief Of Salon Magazine, Discusses The
Trials And Tribulations Of Running An Online Magazine (NPR radio broadcast, June 14,
2000).
32. See Cannon, supra note 30. See also Correcting the Record: Times Reporter Who
Resigned Leaves Long Trail of Deception, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2003, at Al (detailing
NYT reporter Jayson Blair's fabrication of facts in many NYT articles); Blake Morrison,
Ex-USA Today Reporter Faked Major Stories, USA TODAY, March 19, 2004, at 1A;
FabricationsMar Reporters Work, USA TODAY, March 19, 2004, at 16A ("Jack Kelley
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checkers are neither well paid nor well qualified to assure the

accuracy of the information their employers print. Not all
publications use them. Often, fact checkers must rely on authors to
direct them to corroborating sources. The customs of different
disciplines may control how carefully content is checked.33 Correcting
errors in print publications is difficult and expensive. Except in cases
egregious enough to merit a recall, 4 the corrections must be put off
until the publication of a later edition.
On the World Wide Web, in contrast, correcting errors and

revising documents is simple and inexpensive. One can rewrite a file
several times each day and spend nothing more than the time that it
takes to enter the revisions and transmit the file to the server. If one
makes a mistake, there are dozens of eager volunteers likely to send
one an email offering corrections.3" Indeed, the feedback of
knowledgeable readers is a powerful force promoting accuracy on the
web. With the world looking in, errors are much more likely to be
identified,' and correcting them is easy.
Stepping back to look at the whole dynamic information space, it
becomes clear that the remote participation of readers doesn't stop at
writing comments in other people's blogs, or even at writing in to
correct errors or misstatements. Fellow enthusiasts are likely to reuse
the information they find in one web page-or a dozen-in their own
web pages. A reader may simply post a hyperlink to someone else's
page, or she may appropriate some prose, combine it with her own
prose and additional prose lifted from some other sites, and post the
wrote hundreds of stories during his 21-year career at the nation's largest newspaper.
Substantial portions of some of his most memorable stories are untrue.").
33. Law is a particularly curious example. The editors of most law journals are
students, and the closest we get to fact checking is cite-checking,' where students will
confirm that sources support the assertions for which they are cited. In practice, anything
can be corroborated merely by identifying some document that asserts it.
34. Florence Fabricant, Magazine Corrects a Cookie Recipe, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,
1991 at C4 (Gourmet magazine published a recipe calling for "oil of wintergreen" as an
ingredient. Upon discovering that oil of wintergreen is toxic, the magazine sent out a
warning letter to its 800,000 subscribers.); Heather McPherson, Icebox Rolls and Other
Things that Go Bump in the Kitchen, ORLANDO SENTINAL TRIBUNE, April 7, 2004, at F1
(error in icebox roll recipe posed fire hazard and led to the recall of the April 2004 issue of
Southern Living Magazine).
35. For my Law in Cyberspace seminar, I post all students' assignments. See
http://www.law.wayne.edu/litman/classes/cyber/syllabus.html. I regularly get email from
complete strangers objecting to one of my students' characterizations of facts or law and
requesting or demanding that I replace the file with a corrected version.
36. See Clive Thompson, The Honesty Virus, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, March 21,
2004, at 24 (suggesting that one reason people are careful what they post on the Internet is
that they realize how easy it is for online liars to get caught).

12

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[27.1

amalgam as her own (with or without attribution). Thus does
information spread. What makes this economy so astonishingly useful
is information sharing-we're not each downloading facts from some
giant Encyclopedia Britannica in the sky. We are both finding what
we need and making available material that we've generated or
assembled.
3
Who invented the phonograph?

This information system is vital and dynamic because
information sharing is almost frictionless. Material is passed along at
low cost with few practical or legal barriers. Jeff Dalehite, webmaster
of scratchdj.com, is free to post the details of the early history of the
phonograph without seeking the consent of his sources. Dalehite's
site tells us that Thomas Edison invented the cylinder phonograph in
the 1870s and patented it in 1878. Dalehite recounts the details of the
commercial standards competition between Edison's phonograph and
the disk gramophone introduced to the U.S. market in 1901 by the
Victor Talking Machine Company." He attributes none of his
sources; he need not even know whether the information he has
abstracted was original to the references he used or derived by them
from some other source. Technical writer Samuel Berliner III has
posted a site honoring famous people throughout history named
Berliner. His site reports that the disk gramophone was invented by
Emile Berliner in 1887. Berliner needs no permission from Frederick
W. Nile, the author of a 1926 biography of Emile Berliner, 39 nor the
National Inventors Hall of Fame, who have posted a short profile of
Berliner,4" from whom he initially learned that information. 4 Neither
Dalehite nor Berliner has secured a license from Tommy
Cichanowski for any facts they might have learned by studying

37. According to the Audio Engineering Society Historical Committee, "Thomas
Alva Edison, working in his lab, succeeds in recovering Mary's Little Lamb from a strip of
tinfoil wrapped around a spinning cylinder." Audio Engineering Society Historical
Committee, Audio Timeline, at http://www.aes.org/aeshc/docs/audio.history.timeline.html.
Edison and Emile Berliner each has a plausible claim to the invention of the first
phonograph record. Edison's invention was first, but used rotating cylinders rather than a
flat disk. Berliner appears to have invented the disk format for phonograph recordings.
See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
38. See The History of Turntablism,at http://www.scratchdj.com/history.shtml.
39. FREDERIC W. NILE, EMILE BERLINER: MAKER OF THE MICROPHONE (1926).
40. See Hall of Fame Inventor Profile: Emile Berliner at http://www.invent.org/
hall-of-fame/13.html.
41. See S. Berliner III, Emile Berliner Page, at http://home.att.net/-BerlinerUltrasonics/berlemil.html.
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Tommy's History of Western Technology, nor have they sought the
blessing of the periodical Electronic Design, whose February 1976

issue commemorating the U.S, bicentennial43 furnished many of the
dates that Cichanowski reports. If one were unable to post facts

without determining who controlled them and obtaining a license to
pass those facts on, this online information space would not exist.
II. Formalities and Default Rules
Who wrote "When I was One-and-Twenty"?"
The purpose of copyright is to promote the progress of science,
by encouraging the production and dissemination of works of
authorship.4 The contributions of this networked digital information

42. Tommy Cichanowski, Tommy's History of Western Technology at
http://www.luminet.net/-wenonah/history/edpart3.htm.
43. 24 Electronic Design No. 4 (Feb. 1976)
44. A. E. Housman. See, e.g., http://www.amherst.edu/-rjyanco/literature/
alfrededwardhousman/poems/ashropshirelad/wheniwasoneandtwenty.html. The answer is
not in BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992). The
Encyclopedia Britannica has a nice squib on Mr. Housman, but doesn't mention the titles
of any of his poems. See 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 85 (15th ed. 1989). The poem is
included in OSCAR WILLIAMS, A LITTLE TREASURY OF MODERN POETRY 62 (1952), but
the book is indexed only by author and not by title.
45. We in the intellectual property community have come to accept a version of that
principle based on a primitive conception of the economic analysis of law: copyright
promotes authorship by offering incentives to authors that encourage them to create new
works and distribute them to the public. Thus, it has become conventional to argue that
enhanced copyright protection is desirable if and only if it enhances incentives, or that any
diminution in copyright protection will discourage the creation of new works by reducing
authors' and publishers' incentives. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for
Copyright, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970); I Trotter Hardy, The Internet and the Law.
Copyright and "New-Use" Technologies, 23 NOVA L. REV. 657 (1999); Deborah Tussey,
Owning the Law: IntellectualPropertyRights in Primary Law, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 173, 226-28 (1998). The incentive rationale for copyright has become
so conventional that it is easy to forget that it is in fact relatively recent. See Litman, supra
note 1, at 79-81. The Supreme Court first articulated an incentive explanation for
copyright in 1975, in a case in which it explained that copyright's incentives for authors
must yield to the public's interest in broad dissemination of protected works. See
Twentieth Century Music v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,156 (1975):
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the limited
copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing
claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded,
but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our
copyright law is to secure a fair return for an "author's" creative labor. But the
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good. "The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in
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space to the "Progress of Science" are difficult to overestimate.

Already, a network of people sharing what they know has made many
of the most popular reference sources obsolete. Thus, one might
reasonably expect that a law designed to promote the Progress of
Science would encourage the robust growth and prodigious use of this
network to exchange the full spectrum of interesting material.
Under current law, though, the information space I'm talking
about is lawful only because so much of its content-the facts,
information, and ideas-is in the public domain. 6 To the extent that
the material in this information space is in the public domain, we can
all share it, use it, and reuse it. To the extent it's protected by
copyright, on the other hand, we would need permission to do all of
that, and, as a practical matter, it would be impossible to secure that
permission. One of the most salient lessons from the copyright wars
of the last few years is that if express permission is required before
one can post a collection of anything on the Internet, one will be
unable to do it. 7

To appreciate the extent of the problem, it's helpful to review
key changes in the copyright law and the information space over the
past thirty years. Today, facts are some of the only material solidly

part of the public domain. Thirty years ago, the public domain was far
more expansive. In 1974, federal copyright protection was not
automatic. To get it, you needed to distribute copies of your work to
the public, and the copies needed to be marked with a copyright

conferring the monopoly," this Court has said, "lie in the general benefits derived
by the public from the labors of authors."
(quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doral, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)) (footnotes omitted). A
discussion of the economic rationale for copyright in the earlier case of Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1952), described the basis for copyright in terms of reward and
desert:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted to such creative
activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.
The rationale has evolved into a justification for any expansion in the scope of copyright
protection: stronger copyrights mean more powerful incentives mean that more works of
authorship will be created and distributed to a larger slice of the public. Opponents of
copyright expansion have tried to argue against enhancements within the confines of the
incentive model, with little success. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2002).
46. See, e.g., Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service, 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
47. See LITMAN, supra note 1, at 151-65; Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337 (2002); Danny O'Brien, Something Completely Different, WIRED,
Nov. 2003, at 29, 31.
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notice.' Notice of copyright-the familiar C-in-a-circle, along with
the name of the copyright owner and the date the work was first
published-secured copyright. Distributing copies without notice
caused the work to enter the public domain.49 Indeed, while the
copyright system offered authors protection for a limited time as an
incentive to encourage them to distribute their works to the public, it
also attempted to ensure that most works entered the public domain
promptly, so that the public could make unfettered use of them.0
Copyright law was designed to separate works whose authors wanted
copyright protection enough to follow a few simple rules for
preserving it, from works that would have been created and
distributed anyway."
Thirty years ago, when you saw something you wanted to use or
share, the default rule was that you were entitled to do so. Unless the
object was marked "do not copy" you were, with some modest
exceptions, entitled to assume it was in the public domain, because
the absence of a copyright notice ensured that it was in the public
domain (even if it hadn't been before)." Not only that, but the notice
had to be accurate, had to tell you when the copyright was scheduled
to expire, and had to tell you to whom you needed to address any
request for permission. 3 The overwhelming majority of potentially
copyrightable works didn't have this notice and entered the public
domain the minute copies were publicly distributed. Of the ones that
bore the prescribed copyright notice, only a fraction were registered,
and of the fraction that were registered, only 15% were renewed, so
for most of the copyright-protected works that had the requisite
notice, copyright protection lasted only 28 years.'

48. Copyright Act, ch. 320, §§ 10, 19, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078-1079 (1909) (current version
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 401, 402 (2000)). Section 12 of the Act permitted copyright in designated
classes of unpublished works to be secured through registration. Those works-lectures,
plays, paintings, sculptures and motion pictures-were commonly commercially exploited
without distributing copies to the public. Id. at § 12
49. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 154-55 (1986); see,
e.g., J.A. Richards v. New York Post, 23 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
50. See, e.g., London v. Biograph, 231 F. 696 (2d Cir. 1916); Stone & McCarrick v.
Dugan Piano, 210 F. 399 (E.D. La. 1914).
51. Accord LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 133-39 (2004).
52. See Vincent Doyle et. al., Notice of Copyright, 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 229,
231 (1968).
53. See ALAN LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 121-41 (5th ed. 1979).
54. See Barbara Ringer, Renewal of Copyright, 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 503, 583
(1968).
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When was the U.S. army first officially racially segregated? When was it
officially integrated?55

The formalities get a bad rap these days. We've left that sort of
thinking behind us; we're more enlightened now. We know better
than to condition copyright protection on a bunch of technical
requirements. 6 (We feel more comfortable conditioning use of

copyrighted works on a bunch of even more technical requirements. 7 )
The formalities have been so thoroughly discredited that some of us
have even stopped teaching them.58
What we miss when we dismiss the formalities as characteristic of
a provincial and outmoded attitude is that the formalities were the
principal method embodied in U.S. copyright law for preserving the
public domain and encouraging the public to use, reuse, and share
potentially copyrightable material. If you read older copyright cases,

textbooks and law review articles, you find a broad consensus that

copyright law was designed to encourage the growth of the public

domain.5 9 The theory underlying the system was that a rich public
55. According to the Redstone Arsenal Historical Information, History of Black
Military Service, at http://www.redstone.army.mil/history/integrate/history.htm, African
American soldiers served side by side with whites as well as in segregated units until 1820,
when Congress passed a law prohibiting the enlistment of blacks in the Army. Bennie J.
McRae, Jr.'s Lest We Forget site at http://www.coax.net/people/lwfihisusct.htm explains
that African-American volunteers sought to serve in the Civil War, but Lincoln initially
refused to permit enlistment of black soldiers. In 1862, Congress passed a law authorizing
the use of black troops. A number of black companies were recruited and in 1863, the War
Department established the Bureau of Colored Troops. During the Civil War, blacks
served in segregated regiments, commanded by white officers. The Gilder Lehrman
Institute of American History, at http://www.gliah.uh.edu/historyonline/integrating.cfm,
reports that it was not until 1869 that Congress enacted a law requiring soldiers to fight in
racially segregated units. In 1948, President Truman issued an executive order directing
the armed forces to desegregate. Integration began slowly on a unit-by-unit basis, and in
1951, the Army Chief of Staff ordered all units to desegregate.
56. See Jane C. Ginsburg & John M. Kernochan, One Hundred And Two Years
Later: The U.S. Joins the Berne Convention, 13 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 1 (1988).
57. See Litman, supra note 1, at 22-34.
58. See, e.g., SHELDON W. HALPERN, DAVID E. SHIPLEY & HOWARD B. ABRAMS,
COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 43-44, 295-97 (1992). Compare ALAN LATMAN
AND ROBERT A. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES: CASES AND MATERIALS
263-303 (1981), with ROBERT A GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES

AND MATERIALS 383-413 (6th ed. 2001), and BENJAMIN KAPLAN & RALPH S. BROWN,
COPYRIGHT 100-157 (1960), with RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENICOLA,
COPYRIGHT 35-48 (8th ed. 2002).
59. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S.
123, 127-8 (1932). See also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228-29 (1990); L. RAY
PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968); David Lange,
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domain was essential to the progress of knowledge. By offering
copyright for a limited time to authors who distributed their works to
the public, copyright bribed them to generate material for the public
domain."
The old rules worked to preserve copyright for works whose
owners wanted it enough to take the affirmative steps required to
assert it. The law made copyright subject to exceedingly modest
requirements to claim protection and put the public on notice. It was
designed to force everything else into the public domain, so that
everyone else could make whatever use of it they wanted. Copyright
wasn't automatic, but it was easy to secure. Putting a notice on
publicly distributed copies might not be trivial, but it is far easier than
the effort involved in applying for a patent, or registering a
trademark. Retaining copyright after the initial 28-year term was a
little harder, but again, not very hard. Nothing one would need a
lawyer for. Meanwhile, the rules were designed to make it easier for
people who wanted to negotiate a license to use a work protected by
copyright to know whether and whom they needed to ask. Again, for
most licenses, a lawyer would be strictly optional.
Congress abandoned many of the formalities when it enacted the
1976 Copyright Revision Act,61 and ditched the rest of them in 1989
when we acceded to the Berne Convention.62 In 1976, we essentially
abolished the rule that publication without notice or with inaccurate
notice sent the work into the public domain,63 and in 1989 we
abolished the notice requirement entirely.' We also made other
changes to the law that, cumulatively, reversed the default rule.

Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981). But see EATON

S. DRONE, DRONE ON COPYRIGHT 1-26 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1879) (arguing that
literary property has its origins in natural law and, like other property, should be
perpetual).
60. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1013 (1990); L. Ray
Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright and FairUse, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987).
61. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
62. Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853.
63. In 1976, Congress enacted the 1976 Copyright Act. Although the 1976 Act
required copyright notice, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 401, 402, it also included generous savings
provisions that allowed copyright owners to cure notice defects. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 404, 405,
406 (2000). By muting the effect of no notice or inaccurate notice, Congress caused notice
to stop performing both its function of establishing what was and was not protected by
copyright, and also its function of notifying the public what rights it had and whom it
needed to ask for permission to copy a work.
64. See 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 437-54 (1994).
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Today, all potentially copyrightable works are protected by copyright,
whether their authors want copyright protection or not.65
How do you make Shaker lemon pie? 66
A second, less obvious but still crucial, change transformed the
U.S. copyright system from one designed to ensure the enhancement
of the public domain to one designed to support the indefinite
proprietary treatment of articulated thought. In 1976, Congress
adopted divisibility of copyright.67 So far as I can tell, the change was
completely uncontroversial. Divisibility is exceedingly useful. It's the
biggest reason that authors don't need to sign over their copyrights
when they publish things. It allows the author to keep control over
different sorts of exploitation of her work by different entities. The
problem with divisibility is that it potentially requires multiple
licenses for any single use of a copyrighted work, while
simultaneously making it very difficult to tell who owns the rights one
needs to license.6

65. There is a rich recent copyright literature analyzing the problems that have
accompanied recent expansions in copyright rights. Most of the scholarship focuses on
substantive expansion: in copyright subject matter, in the duration of copyright, and in the
scope of copyright rights. See, e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the
Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003); Dennis S.
Karjala, The Term of Copyright in LAURA N. GASSAWAY, GROWING PAINS: ADAPTING
COPYRIGHT FOR LIBRARIES, EDUCATION AND SOCIETY 33 (1997); LAWRENCE LESSIG,

THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 196-99 (2001); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright within
the FirstAmendment Skein, 54 STAN L. REV. 1, 12-30 (2001); L. Ray Patterson, Copyright
and "the Exclusive Right" of Authors, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1993). Relatively little
critical attention has focused on the formalities.
66. Someone named Susan Green submitted the classic version of the recipe to
AllRecipe's site at www.pierecipes.com, see http://www.pierecipes.com/az/
ShakerLemonPie.asp. The same recipe was submitted by someone named Pat Dennis to
the
Carnegie
Mellon
University
recipe
server.
See
http://www2
.cs.cmu.edu/-mjw/recipes/pie/sweet/shaker-lemon-pie.html. The Encyclopedia Britannica
Online at http://www.britannica.com/ ("Search Results You Can Trust") includes entries
for "lemon," "pie" and "Shaker," but nothing for "shaker lemon pie."
67. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 123 (1976).
68. See Mark A. Lemley, Dealing With Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 547 (1997); Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music
Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673 (2003); John Schwartz, Music Sharing Service at
M.LT. is Shut Down, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2003, at C13. Professor Lydia Loren recently
summed up the problems the music industry faces in putting its works online:
[T]here are too many vested industry players for downstream users to be able to
efficiently obtain the authorizations needed for downstream use of recorded
music. Second, the divisible yet overlapping rights granted to copyright owners
lead to industry gridlock and problems with holdout behavior. Finally, the
demands for payment from the downstream user by too many vested industry
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There once was an interesting Internet start-up named MP3.com,
which specialized in making both major-label and unsigned music
available in the MP3 format. MP3.com intended to stream
copyrighted music to its subscribers, and bought ASCAP and BMI
public performance licenses to allow it to do so. That seems right. If

you look at the statutory definition of public performance, it appears
to cover Internet streaming quite nicely.69 MP3.com got sued for
willful infringement (and lost) because it didn't also license the
reproduction rights to those songs, which are controlled by a different
entity.0
This is much worse in the Internet context because copyright
owners have asserted, so far successfully, that every time a work is
made available over the Internet, someone has reproduced the work,
distributed the work, and publicly performed or displayed the work."
Anyone who wants to post a work on the web, thus, needs a license
from the owners of each of these rights, plus a license from the
owners of each of these rights in any underlying works that are
incorporated within the work. Under the current leading analysis of
how copyright law interacts with the Internet, making any material
available over the Internet (whether via posting it on a website,

players, combined with industry consolidation, result in the price being too high
to achieve the goal of copyright.
Loren, supra, at 698.
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000):
To perform or display a work "publicly" means ... (2) to transmit or otherwise
communicate a performance or display of the work.., to the public, by means of
any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving
the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and
at the same time or at different times.
70. See TEEVEE Toons v. MP3.com, 134 F. Supp. 2d 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); UMG
Recordings v. MP3.com, 109 F. Supp. 2d 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also Schwartz, supra
note 68 (MIT music streaming service suspended because of dispute over whether the
licensors of the various elements of the service had the authority to sell MIT the licenses it
purchased).
71. See Loren, supra note 68, at 696-702. The argument that any Internet appearance
of a work should be treated as an invasion of multiple copyright rights appears to have
been first publicly articulated by Bruce Lehman's Information Infrastructure Task Force,
see supra note 8, and accompanying text, in an effort to settle the dispute between
composers and music publishers over whether Internet transmissions of music should be
deemed public performances (licensed by ASCAP, BMI & SESAC) or distributions
(licensed by the Harry Fox Agency, a subsidiary of the National Music Publishers
Association). The Task Force's answer was both. See INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 213-25; Lemley, supra note 68, at 550-59.
72. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, A Primer on U.S. Intellectual Property Rights
Applicable to Music Information Retrieval Systems, ILL. J. OF LAW, TECH. & POL.
(forthcoming Winter 2004); Loren, supra note 68, at 696-98.
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sending it through email, posting it to Usenet news, typing it on
Internet relay chat or making it available in a share directory
associated with a peer-to-peer file trading application) constitutes a
reproduction of the material, a distribution of the material to the
public, and a public display or performance of the material. It is
therefore illegal unless done with the authorization of the copyright
owners of the reproduction right, the public distribution right, and the
public display or public performance right, as well as the copyright
owners of those rights in any underlying material.73 It counts as an
actionable copy notwithstanding the fact that the reproduction may
be ephemeral (what the law used to deem unfixed)." It counts as a
distribution to the public notwithstanding the fact that no tangible
copy of the material is transferred (what the law used to deem a
display or performance rather than a distribution).75 It constitutes a
public display or performance notwithstanding the fact that any
display or performance may occur only between two individual
computers (what the law used to deem private).76
Indeed, there's some indication in the case law that making a
hyperlink to material available over the Internet may be deemed to
be a reproduction, public distribution, and public performance or
public display, requiring the permission of the owners of the
reproduction, distribution and public performance and display rights
in the material on the other end of the link.77 Moreover, the theory
underlying the recording industry's recent service of more than a
thousand subpoenas78 on Internet service providers and universities

73.

See Carroll, supra note 72.

74.

See Intellectual Reserve v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290

(D.Utah 1999); GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 416-20. Unfixed reproductions
don't infringe the copyright owner's right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords." See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).

75.

See Playboy v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993); GORMAN &

GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 544-47.
76. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). Private

performances and displays don't infringe the copyright owner's rights to perform and
display the copyrighted work publicly. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4), 106(5); see, e.g., Columbia

Pictures v. Professional Real Estate Investors, 866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1989).
77. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir., 2002), withdrawn 336 F.3d 811,
2003 (9th Cir. 2003); Cf. Intellectual Reserve v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 75 F. Supp. 2d
1290 (D.Utah 1999)(posting URL of infringing material on the web is contributory

infringement). See generally Stacey L. Dogan, Infringement Once Removed: The Perils of
Hyperlinking to Infringing Content, 87 IOWA L. REV. 829 (2002).
78. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, RIAA Subpoena Database Query Tool, at
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/riaasubpoenas/. Or you could rely on the proprietary "RIAA

Case Activity" service from Lexis/Nexis Courtlink at http://www.lexisnexis.com/trialU
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appears to be that merely possessing an unauthorized digital copy of a
protected work, in circumstances in which a member of the public
could download a copy of the work from the possessor's hard disk,
79
may itself be infringing distribution. A bill introduced in the 108th
Congress extends that argument further. Under Congressman
Conyers's Author, Consumer, and Computer Owner Protection and
Security Act, possessing an unauthorized digital copy could constitute

felony distribution.80
And (as if that weren't troubling enough) largely because of the
adoption of divisibility of copyright, in many if not most cases, it can
be difficult and sometimes impossible to discover who the copyright

owners of all of those rights are.8 One of the more disturbing
revelations of the Napster litigation was that record companies
insisted that they were unable to generate a list of the copyrighted
works they claimed to own.82 (This is particularly disquieting because
one would assume they kept records in order to send out those
royalty checks they're supposed to be sending out, but apparently
not.) Some of the problem, apparently, is record keeping, but not
most of it. In addition to difficulties caused by lost or misfiled records,
there is significant legal uncertainty about the ownership of rights to
control digital exploitation of works that are subject to contracts
contemplating conventional exploitation.83 Record companies, for
nalm100181clinkriaa.asp, which, as of November 2, 2003, was significantly out of date. The
recording industry claimed that section 512(h) of the copyright law, which requires
Internet service providers to identify subscribers responsible for posting infringing
material on the ISP's servers, also required ISPs to name subscribers the RIAA had
identified as maintaining allegedly infringing copies on their personal computers. See
Recording Industry of America v. Verizon, Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
79. The theory of liability appears to be based on the idea that the 106(3) distribution
right in the U.S. copyright statute should be read expansively to encompass the equivalent
of the European right, under article 3 of the EU Directive, to make a work available or
communicate it to the public. See Council Directive 2001/29/EC, art. 3 (2001). That makes
little sense given the overall structure of the US copyright statute, which separates public
performance and public display from distribution to the public, and specifies distinct
privileges and exceptions for each of them. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 109, 110, 111, 112, 118 (2000)
80. H.R. 2752, 108th Cong. (2003). The Bill would define "placing of a copyrighted
work ... on a computer network accessible to the public" as criminal copyright
infringement unless the copyright owner had authorized it. A conventional home or WiFi
network without firewall protection is accessible to the public in the sense the bill defines
it.
81. See O'Brien, supra note 47, at 31.
82. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 925 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (plaintiffs claim "it would be burdensome or even impossible to identify all of the
copyrighted music they own" but have made a minimal effort to describe the works
involved in the lawsuit), affd in part,rev'd in part,239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
83. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 68.
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example, have claimed to own all copyright rights in the recorded
music they distribute under the work-made-for-hire doctrine, but
most experts agree that those claims are unpersuasive. 84 A successful
effort to amend the copyright law to strengthen the record labels'
work-made-for-hire arguments excited so much outrage among
musicians that the recording industry persuaded Congress to repeal
the amendment the following year.85 Without the benefit of a workmade-for-hire claim, though, the record labels' claims to own the
digital rights to the recordings they produce requires a work-by-work,
contract-by-contract analysis. New York Times v. Tasini86 and
Random House v. Rosetta Books'

teach

us that contractual

assignments of copyright may not necessarily include the electronic
rights. We'd have to examine the contracts to be sure. We might need
to know whether the case would be coming up on the east coast or the
west coast. We'd also need to see the contract between the composer
and the music publisher for each song on the recording, and the
contracts between each of the music publishers and the record
company that recorded each song. Those contracts aren't publicly
available. One suspects that a large number of them are no longer in
anyone's file cabinets either. Bottom line: we don't know with any
certainty who owns the digital rights in any number of recorded
musical performances. That may be why record companies have
scrambled to settle cases when their ownership of sound recordings is
actually put in issue.89 If I want to share my music collection with my
newfound friend who was able to tell me that the "Fuct of Pepsiman"
is a promotional toy released in Japan by the Pepsi Cola Company,
there isn't any way for me to figure out whose permission I need to
ask.
Today, in short, everything is protected by copyright and it is
almost impossible to figure out whom to ask for permission. Just as

84. See, e.g., Marci Hamilton, The Constitution and Your CDs, Findlaw's Writ, 2000,
at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20000919.html.
85.

See Sound Recordings As Works Made For Hire: Hearing Before the Subcomm.

On Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
(May 25, 2000) (Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights).
86. New York Times v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
87. Random House v. Rosetta Books, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), affd, 283
F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002). See also Greenberg v. National Geographic, 244 F.3d 1267 (11th
Cir. 2001).
88. Compare Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d
481 (2d Cir. 1998), with Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988).
89. See Marci Hamilton, The Story Behind the MP3.com Judgment, Findlaw's Writ,
2000, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20001123.html.
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we built a communications network that would permit us, if we chose
to, to dispense with a complicated and expensive distribution
infrastructure, we ditched the legal rules that would have permitted
us to do so.'
Il. Digression: The Music of Room A-9
What are the lyrics to "The Syncopated Clock?"91
When my son was in the third grade, one of his assignments
required him to conduct research on the flora, fauna, and climate of
the alpine tundra. His teacher didn't send him to look it up in
books-indeed, the school library didn't have a lot of information to
offer on the alpine tundra. My son's teacher sent him to look it up on
the Web. She gave him a list of URLs for some websites that were
likely to lead him to the information he needed, and sat him down in
front of a computer to do his research. At the end of the school year,
this teacher said goodbye to the class and presented all of the students
with a souvenir: A home-burned CD full of Room A-9's favorite
songs. Where did the songs come from? My son's elementary school
teacher had downloaded them from the Internet herself so the class
could enjoy them. Room A-9 apparently especially liked the Sugar
Beats' rendition of "Put A Little Love in Your Heart."9
When an elementary school teacher helps her class to download
information about the animals that inhabit the tundra, we all agree
that that's admirable. When she teaches the class to download "Put a
Little Love in Your Heart," at least some of us would argue that
that's reprehensible. Collecting information on the Internet is
"learning." Posting information on the net is "sharing." Try exactly
the same thing with recorded music and it's "stealing." When my
son's teacher downloads information from the Internet and shares it
with her students, that's the sort of thing the law is supposed to
encourage; when she downloads music from the Internet and shares it
90. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 120-202 (2001); Yochai
Benkler, A Political Economy of the Public Domain: Markets in Information versus the
Marketplace of Ideas, in ROCHELLE DREYFUSS, DIANE L ZIMMERMAN & HARRY FIRST,
EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY
FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 267 (2001).
91. See and hear, e.g., K(eep) I(t) SS(imple) W(eb) D(esign), The Syncopated Clock,
http://kissd.8m.com/jukebox/51-39.html.
92. THE MUSIC OF ROOM A-9! (2003). The CD includes three cuts by Faith Hill,
three cuts by the Dixie Chicks, four cuts by Kabah, four cuts by the Sugar Beats, two songs
by Sarah Evans, one each by Toby Keith and George Straight, and finally a rendition of
"Chicken Cheer" by the students of Room A-9.
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with her students, that's the sort of thing the law is supposed to
prevent. The law treats the two acts differently because facts are in
the public domain, while music is someone's property. Information
cannot be owned, we're told, because, unlike music, facts aren't
original.93 From my son's teacher's point of view, though, what she's
doing is the same: she's sharing.' From her point of view, there's no
reason to think that it would make intuitive sense that downloading
information to share with her students would be good, while
downloading music to share with her students would be bad. Those of
us who teach copyright know that the distinction between
unprotected fact and protected expression is as elusive and
counterintuitive as anything in the copyright course. 9' There's a
wealth of literature challenging the rule that information is unlike
music in any way that's important to whether we should give it
intellectual property protection.96 Any originality-based distinction
93. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991)
("facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship").
94. I probably need to stop here and defend my use of the term "sharing" since it's
recently come under attack. Some people argue that whatever using peer-to-peer
networking involves, it shouldn't be called "sharing." Richard Parsons, the CEO of TimeWarner, told the U.S. Congress: "The popular term for trafficking in copyrighted works"file sharing"-is a misnomer. It isn't sharing. It's online shoplifting. " Ensuring Content
Protection in the DigitalAge: HearingBefore the Subcomm. On Telecommunicationsof the
House Commerce Comm., 107th Cong. 30 (Apr. 25, 2002) (prepared statement of Richard
Parsons, AOL Time-Warner). Similarly, lawyer David Kendall, who represented
President Clinton during his impeachment and currently represents Hollywood on
copyright issues, has said:
The word "file-sharing" is a euphemism and a serious misnomer.... In fact, it's
not really sharing at all, because if I share a piece of cake with you, we're each
doing with a little less-I have half a piece and you have half a piece. This
doesn't hold true for digital distribution since I don't lose anything by "sharing"
with you.
David Kendall, Copyright in Cyberspace, (March 25, 2002) (Brigance lecture to Wabash
College) availableat http://www.copyrightassembly.org/briefing/DEKWabash
Speech4.htm. Kendall is talking about sharing cake or cookies. That's the wrong
metaphor. Sharing digital objects is less like sharing cookies and more like sharing ideaswhen I share my ideas, I don't lose anything. Of course, it's precisely the difference
between cookies and ideas that causes us to treat the first as tangible property and the
second as intellectual property. Cookies have to be allocated. Ideas need not. Indeed, the
purpose of the intellectual property regime is to achieve widespread sharing by
temporarily endowing IP with some-and only some-of the attributes of tangible
property. If we can achieve widespread sharing without endowing IP with those attributes,
then we ought at least to question whether the attributes of tangible property are the tools
we need.
95. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, COPYRIGHT AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/NALUE
DISTINCTION (2002) (manuscript on file with author).
96. See, e.g., Michael Steven Green, Copyrighting Facts, 78 IND. L. J. 919 (2003);
Hartwell Harris Beall, Comment; Can Anyone Own A Piece Of The Clock?: The
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between facts and notes is untenable, we're told, since unearthing and
assembling facts takes at least as much creativity and often lots more
money than writing a song. 97 Scholar after scholar has deconstructed
the supposed rationales for giving factual information different
treatment from fiction, and concluded that the asserted differences
can't be defended. The inescapable conclusion, they've told us, is that
we need to give comparable intellectual property protection to
information.9 8 There's a perennial bill pending in the U.S. Congress
that threatens to do just that;99 it's even passed the House of
Representatives once or twice."
Copyright scholars never seem to reverse the syllogism. You
never run into an argument that says: if facts and music are equivalent
in the respects that matter, and we have an ample, readily accessible
and diverse supply of facts when the law gives them no protection,
shouldn't we at least investigate what sort of musical smorgasbord we
might develop if we treated music comparably?
IV. Resetting the Default Rules
Who are the Sugar Beats?1" 1

We have a mature information market on the Internet that
allows almost anyone with a net connection to find the answer to
almost any question by consulting what would a generation ago have
been an unimaginable wealth of information resources. This
information space has sprung up not despite but because of the
Troublesome Application Of Copyright Law To Works Of Historical Fiction,
Interpretation, And Theory, 42 EMORY L. J. 253 (1993); Anant S. Narayanan, Note;
Standards Of Protection For Databases In The European Community And The United
States: Feist And The Myth Of Creative Originality, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
457 (1993).
97. E.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Sabotaging and Reconstructing History: A Comment on
the Scope of Copyright Protection in Works of History after Hoehling v. Universal City
Studios, 29 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 647 (1982); Robert Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The
Implicationsfor Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 560 (1982); Beryl Jones, Copyright:
FactualCompilationsand the Second Circuit, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 679 (1986).
98. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, "No Sweat" Copyright, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338
(1992).
99. The current version is H.R. 3261, 108th Cong. (2003).
100. See H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1998).
101. The Sugar Beats' website at http://www.sugar-beats.comlabout/ explains that the
musicians are thirty-something parents who wondered why kids and parents didn't like to
listen to the same music and hit on the idea of recording "hip" and "funky" tunes from the
60s, 70s and 80s in children's voices, to entice kids to sing along. I wouldn't have thought it
would work either, but Room A-9's experience suggests that I don't have a good handle
on what sells.
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absence of any copyright protection for facts. (If you doubt me, stop a
moment for a thought experiment, and imagine what this information
space would look like if we adopted and enforced a legal rule that no
fact could be posted without the permission of the originator of that
fact or his employer or assignee.) At worst, this information space is
an invaluable adjunct to the library of reference books, and at best it's
a superior alternative for retrieving and disseminating information. If
consumer-to-consumer
dissemination can create a superior
information marketplace, shouldn't we give serious consideration to
the idea that it would create a superior music marketplace? The
digital information space is compelling at least as much because of the
variety and ecology of shared information as because of the
convenience and speed that might be supplied by an online
"encyclopedia world," containing the digitized text of the
Encyclopedia Britannica and a dozen of its competitors. Consumerto-consumer dissemination of music might enable the evolution of a
music space with comparable variety. That potential is more exciting
than the advantages of instant gratification that accompany the ability
to download whatever music the record labels are currently selling.
Just as we wouldn't want to get all of our facts from some giant
Encyclopedia Britannica in the sky, there's no need to cabin our
musical tastes to reflect what's currently selling in online or offline
stores.
How old is the recording industry? n°
At this point, the vast majority of the copyright specialists who
stuck with me through part III have stopped reading. They've decided
that this is just another rant by one of those copyright-hating
academics.' 3 There's no rush to reassure them that I'm not seriously
102. Early phonographs were marketed as dictation machines. Historians date the
release of the first commercial recordings to 1889, when both the Edison Company and
the Columbia Phonograph company sold wax cylinders containing musical recordings. See,
e.g., Steven E. Schoenherr, Charles Sumner Tainter and the Gramophone (1999),

http://history.acusd.edu/gen/recording/graphophone.html;
Steven
E.
Schoenherr,
Recording Technology History (revised Feb. 16, 2004) at http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/
recordinglnotes.html#cylinder; Washington Area Music Association, D.C. Music Timeline
(2003), availableat http://www.wamadc.com/wama/dc_musictimeline.html.
103. See Andrea L. Foster, Scholars Rally to Online Magazine's Defense Over
Publishing Software Code, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Feb. 16, 2001, available

at http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/-dst/DeCSS/Gallery/chronicle-16-feb-2001.html
(quoting a
film industry lawyer's complaints about "a group of anti-copyright professors" who
"represent a small extremist wing of the academic community"). See also Jonathan
Zittrain,

The

Copyright Cage, LEGAL AFFAIRS,

July-August

2003,

available at

http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2003/featurezittrain-julaugO3.html
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suggesting anything so radical as treating music exactly the way we
treat facts, or dumping all recorded music into the public domain.
They are no longer paying attention. We can take some time to
reflect on what the music world might look like if we did.
Imagine a world in which consumers were free to copy and
transmit any and all recorded musical they wished to. Someone who
wants to avoid shelling out $18.98 plus tax for Norah Jones's Feels
Like Home ' °4 could download it from the hard drive of a priceinsensitive fan who lives down the block. Someone searching for a
track from the 1960s that she hasn't heard in 40 years could find it in
the collection of another music lover half way around the world. If
one considers only the universe of existing recordings, the promise of
copyright-free consumer-to-consumer distribution of music seems
boundless. If one were able to prevent-or at least prohibit-spoofing
and other well-poisoning,15 we would have a highly efficient, cheap
distribution network. The potential range of the marketplace,
including music too marginal to market, too obscure to clear, too
unusual to fit into conventional marketing niches, would allow us to
find music to scratch almost any itch in our minds' ears as easily as we
have become able to satisfy both idle and abiding curiosity with a few
clicks of a mouse. Moreover, our experience with nascent peer-topeer file sharing thus far suggests a strong likelihood that a variety of
mechanisms would arise for sorting music and directing the attention
of people likely to want it to the appropriate files, and that those
would prove at least as effective as the current marketing
mechanisms
devices."°

(reporting that a colleague asked him why all law professors who specialize in Internet law
"hate copyright").
104. Billboard reports that Jones' Feels Like Home is the top selling album as of
March 15, 2004. See Billboard.com, Billboard Album Charts (Mar. 15, 2004), availableat
http://www.billboard.com/bb/chartsfbb200.jsp.
105. In an effort to make peer-to-peer file trading less attractive, some copyright
owners have engaged in technological self help measures, "spoofing" files by flooding
peer-to-peer networks with files that do not contain what their name would indicate. See
Catherine Greenman, Taking Sides in the Napster War; With Copyright Law at Issue, Sites
Battle for the Ears and Minds of Music Lovers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2000, at G1.
106. See, e.g., Webjay: Listener Created Radio, available at http://www.webjay.org/;
Katie Dean, Music Gurus Scout Out Free Tunes, WIRED News, April 9, 2004, available at
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,62982,00.html. In the late 1990s, a number of
search engines for music popped up on the web, only to be shut down by litigation
claiming that the services facilitated copyright infringement. See Arista Records v.
MP3Board.com, 2002 U.S. DIST LEXIS 16165 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Twentieth Century Fox v.
Scour, Inc., No. (S.D.N.Y. filed July 20, 2000); Steven Musil, Scour to End File-Swapping
Service, CINET NEWS.COM, Nov. 14, 2000, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-248631.html.
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The story for music not-yet-written or not-yet-recorded is more
complex. Reasonable people differ vehemently about whether
composers would compose songs or performers perform or record
them absent the incentives supplied by the current copyright
system." We have little empirical data to test theories seeking to
explain why musicians make music.' 8 Some people have suggested
that, at least in some genres, musicians are motivated less by the fact
that music is what they love and do best and more by the possibility of
hitting it big as the next mega hit rock star. Others argue that the
most important role in supplying music to a music-loving public is
finding the good stuff. The hard, expensive, crucial task that all the
recording industry's bookkeeping tricks are barely managing to
subsidize is searching for and identifying the musicians whose work
will prove to be worth listening to. These are both completely
plausible stories; we don't yet have the tools to allow us to evaluate
whether they're more true than not.
Perhaps treating recorded music as if it were in the public
domain would usher in an era of enhanced creativity and boundless
profit; perhaps songwriters and musicians would choose to become
lawyers and investment bankers. We don't have the tools to make a
confident prediction. Fortunately, we don't need so extreme a
prescription in order to capture the benefits of consumer-to-consumer
107. Compare, e.g., Stephen Manes, Full Disclosure: Copyright Law Ignore at Your
Peril,P.C. WORLD, Sept. 2003 ("if pilfering persists and pirated content drives out the real
thing, expect hardworking artists to look for vocations that pay. Classic content will be
free for the swiping, but most new stuff will be the product of well-meaning amateurs...")
availableat http://www.pcworld.com/howto/article/0,aid,111657,00.asp; Mike Stoller, Songs
That Won't Be Written, N.Y. TIMES, October 7, 2000, at A15 ("by taking the incentive out
of songwriting, Napster may be pushing itself closer to a time when there won't be any
songs for its users to swap"), with Rodger Walters Online, Interview with Everett True,
April 5, 2002, http://www.rogerwatersonline.com/the-age-interview.htm;
Felix Oberholzer and Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An
Empirical Analysis (March 2004), available at http://www.unc.edu/-cigar/papers/
FileSharingMarch2004.pdf ("the financial incentives for creating recorded music are
quite weak" and therefore reducing payments to recording artists "should have very little
influence on entry into popular music"); Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant: Free
Software and the Death of Copyright, 4 First Monday (1999), available at
http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue4_8/moglen/; and Michael Pfahl, Giving Away
Music to Make Money: Independent Musicians on the Internet, 8 First Monday (2001),
available at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue6_8/pfahl/. See also Courtney Love,
Courtney Love Does the Math, Salon.com, June 14, 2000, available at
http://www.salon.com
108. See Michael W. Carroll, Whose Music Is It Anyway?: How We Came To View
Musical Expression As A Form of Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. - (forthcoming 2004);
Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 306-311 (2002).
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digital distribution. There's no need to jettison copyright protection

for music if, instead, we can apply some of the insight that we've
gained from watching the expanding exchange of information over
the Internet. Creation and dissemination may flourish without the
incentives supposedly supplied by producer control.'" Even if we
believe that copyright-like incentives are sometimes essential to
encourage composers and musicians to create music,"' it doesn't
follow that those precise incentives are necessary to induce
dissemination.
When will the song "Happy Birthday to You" enter the public domain? 1'
Can we design a system that preserves copyright incentives for
creators who rely on them while reducing unnecessary barriers
Our
dissemination?
hampering wide consumer-to-consumer
experience with digital information works suggests that we can. The
flourishing information space on the Internet includes proprietary
content sitting alongside material that is freely shared. Because facts
are in the public domain, but the prose used to communicate those
facts is fully protected by copyright, proprietors of fact-heavy works
have sued, successfully, when their prose is appropriated."' Those
successful lawsuits don't seem to have impeded the free flow of
information significantly. The information ecology continues to
function when some information sources prohibit free exchange of
their material, not because sharers are scrupulous about sharing only
facts and not prose (which they surely are not), but because the
proprietors of information-rich content who insist on controlling the
dissemination of their stuff mark their content and enclose it in
109. See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and
the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 305 (2002).
110. The degree to which U.S. copyright law has sought to motivate creators rather
than distributors is open to question. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 1, at 75:
I have spoken of encouraging "creation" as well as "dissemination," but
copyright has evidently more to do today with mobilizing the profit-propelled
apparatus of dissemination-publication and distribution-than with calling the
signals into first unpublished existence; the latter process must be to a
considerable extent self-generated.
111. That's hard to tell. Some people insist that it is in the public domain already. See,
e.g., J. Byron, Exposing the Happy Birthday Story (June 2003), available at
Wikipedia Fact Index, Happy
http://www.kuro5hin.org/story/2003/7/5/112441/6280;
Urban
Birthday, available at http://www.fact-index.com/h/halhappy-birthday.html;
available at
Birthday,
We'll
Sue,
Reference
Pages:
Happy
Legends
http://www.snopes.comlmusic/songs/birthday.htm. The melody appears to have been
written in 1893, and the lyrics some years later.
112. See New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001); L.A. Times v. Free
Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q.2D 1453 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
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electronic envelopes that give notice of their claims and make it clear
that they have opted out of the prevailing norm of sharing. By and
large, people appear to respect that choice. The coexistence of
proprietary and shared information suggests that we can design a
workable shared music space without taking the drastic step of
dumping music into the public domain. Another of the lessons we can
take from the vibrant commerce in facts that goes on over the
Internet is that allowing, indeed encouraging individuals to share
music, trade music-engage in non-commercial "stealing" of music if
you prefer-without legal liability is not necessarily going to bring the
progress of science and the useful arts to a crashing halt, and it has
lots of advantages over the distribution system that preceded it." 3
What's the name of that song that keeps going through my head?"'
There are vast differences between music and information, but
outside of the fact that the owners of music and sound recording
copyrights have a lot more brute political clout than, say, Reed
Elsevier, I'm not sure that any of those differences undercut the basic
insight: If music in a digital world shares many of the attributes of
information, it may be useful to apply some of the wisdom IP law has
developed over the protection and distribution of information. In
particular, we should remember that widespread dissemination is as
central to the goals of copyright as initial creation; facilitating the sale
of copies is only the means the law has adopted to further those
goals.115 If sharing is a more effective method of dissemination than

113. See, e.g., Chris Nelson, Upstart Labels See File Sharing as Ally, Not Foe, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2003 (cataloging ways that unauthorized file sharing helps independent
record companies compete against conglomerates).
114. See Pamela Licalzi O'Connell, Online Diary: Virtual Cemetery Visits And Naming
That Tune, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2004. See, e.g., LetsSinglt.com (your lyrics engine on the
Internet) (visited March 4, 2004), at http://www.letssingit.com ("The lyrics on this site are
not only submitted by visitors, but also maintained by the visitors. You as visitor can
submit and correct lyrics. These submissions are reviewed by other visitor [sic] whereafter
they are placed in the archive. With this, LetsSinglt.com always has the newest lyrics.").
See also, e.g., Musicnotes.com at http://www.musicnotes.com (a licensed commercial sheet
music sales site with a lyrics search engine).
115. If musicians create music primarily because of the control-based incentives
supplied by copyright law, one might argue that any encouragement of sharing will reduce
the incentives that inspire musicians to produce music. Whether musicians will make
music if the copyright regime is altered is an empirical question, but the fact that so many
musicians have complained so bitterly at their treatment at the hands of record companies
without withholding their music suggests that musicians' motivations are more complex
than the simple copyright-incentive model captures. See Ku, supra note 109, at 300-11. In
addition, history indicates that the absence of enforceable proprietary rights in music has
not dissuaded musicians from creating and performing new works. See Michael W. Carroll,
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selling copies, then prohibiting sharing to protect the market for copy
sales is exactly backward.1 6

If we can agree on that, I think it's relatively easy to work out the
details of a compromise we can live with."7 A growing consensus has
emerged that P2P is exciting technology with one serious flawcreators aren't getting paid." 8 (That flaw characterizes much
conventional distribution as well."') The current conventional system
of music distribution has been successful in disseminating a broad
range of music to consumers and less successful in compensating the
individuals who create that music. Peer-to-peer file trading has so far

proved to be a far more effective distribution mechanism for a
broader range of music, but is even worse than the conventional
system at compensating creators.2 Tweaking peer-to-peer file trading
to incorporate a mechanism for compensating creators is a sensible
response to that problem, and there are a host of recent thoughtful
suggestions outlining ways to do that.2 If the only reason we care

Whose Music Is It Anyway?: How We Came To View Musical Expression As A Form of
Property,72 U. CINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004). I nonetheless suggest in part V that we
adopt a collective license to pay the creators of music for peer to peer file trading.
116. See Ku, supra note 109, at 305 (on the Internet, "copyright serves no purpose
other than to transfer wealth from the public and, as we shall see, artists to distributors. In
this case, the use of Napster is not theft-copyright is theft.")
117. I'd probably be comfortable if we found ourselves in a world in which
noncommercial consumer-to-consumer file sharing was not illegal. Period. No quid pro
quo. I'm confident that we'd figure out ways to ensure that creators of music and the
businesses that market them earn money. I recognize that most people don't share my
confidence, and I'm willing to look hard for a middle ground.
118. See, e.g., Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Authorship Without Ownership:
Reconsidering Incentives In A Digital Age, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1121(2003); Fred
Goldring, Taking Issue: Abandon The 'Shock And Awe' Tactics, BILLBOARD, Oct. 25,
2003 (available on LEXIS); Xeni Jardin, Creative License: Some analysts are proposing
compulsory licenses as the answer to digital piracy, GRAMMY MAGAZINE, July 25, 2003,
availableat http://www.grammy.com/features/2003/0725_complicenses.html; Editorial:End
to File-Swapping Wars Demands Ideas, Not Threats, USA TODAY, July 20, 2003, at 10A,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2003-07-20-our-view-x.htm;
Electronic Frontier Foundation, Let the Music Play, available at http://www.eff.org/share.
119. See Future of Music Coalition, Major Label Contract Clause Critique (Oct. 3,
2001), availableat http://www.futureofmusic.org/contractcrit.cfm.
120. But see a variety of reports indicating that peer-to-peer file sharing leads to
increased CD sales. E.g., Katie Dean, Record Stores: We're Fine Thanks, WIRED NEWS,
March 20, 2004, available at http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,62742,00.html;
Kevin Featherly, Long-Time File-Swappers Buy More Music, Not Less-Update,
NEWSBYTES, April 25, 2002, available at www.bizreport.com/news/3337 (summarizing
study by Jupiter Media Metrix). See also Janis Ian, The Internet Debacle: An Alternative
View, May, 2002, availableat http://www.janisian.com/articles.html ("every time we make
a few songs available on my website, sales of all the CDs go up. A lot").
121. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND
THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 199-258 (2004); Ku, supra note 109, at 312-21; Glynn S.
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about compensation for composers and musicians is to induce them to
make music, the most efficient option is probably to legalize peer-topeer file trading, prohibit well-poisoning 22 and leave creator
compensation untouched-the recording industry has demonstrated
that artists make music even when money is not forthcoming. If our
sense of fairness impels us to compensate creators because they
deserve to be paid, then extracting creator compensation from peerto-peer file trading would probably be an easier route than reforming
the recording and broadcast industries.
Consumer-to-consumer distribution, after all, is a lot less costly
than conventional commercial distribution, and may allow us to free
up resources now spent on CD stamping, shipping, storage, shelf
space and radio payola, not to mention the huge cost of legal efforts
to eradicate what is commonly called "piracy." That money could be

used to pay the people who create the music-something the record
companies insist they can't really afford to do very well under the
current system."3

A number of scholars have floated proposals urging the adoption
of systems that would permit peer-to-peer file sharing, charge money
to the people who enjoy it (or the businesses that profit from it), and
use those funds to compensate creators and copyright owners. 114
Lunney, The Death of Copyright. Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 852-69, 886-920 (2001); Neil W. Netanel,
Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-PeerFile Sharing,17 HARV. J.
L. & TECH. 1 (2003). See also Zimmerman, supra note 118 ("street performer protocol");
EFF, Making P2P Pay Artists, available at http://www.eff.org/share/compensation.php
(summarizing various proposals).
122. Some copyright owners have fought back against peer-to-peer file trading by
"spoofing," see supra note 105, and launching denial-of-service attacks against individuals
perceived to be particularly active file traders. Their cumulative efforts have apparently
succeeded in significantly reducing the reliability of peer-to-peer file trading. The
Recording Industry Association sought legislation that would have immunized copyright
owners from suit or criminal prosecution for damage caused by "disabling, interfering
with, blocking, diverting, or otherwise impairing the unauthorized distribution, display,
performance, or reproduction of his or her copyrighted work on a publicly accessible peerto-peer file trading network .... " See H. R. 5211, 107"' Cong. (2002). The legislation
proved controversial and failed to make it out of the Judiciary Committee.
123. See, e.g., Music on the Internet: Is There an Upside to Downloading?: Hearing
Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Fred Ehrlich,
Recording Industry Association of America), available athttp://www.riaa.com/
news/newsletter/press2000/0711002.asp.
124. See sources cited supra note 121; Daniel Gervais, Copyright, Money and the
Internet, (Mar. 3, 2004), available at http://www.commonlaw.uottawa.ca/faculty/prof/
dgervais/CopyrightMoneyAndThelnternet.pdf. See also Zimmerman, supra note 118
("street performer protocol"); EFF, Making P2P Pay Artists, available at
http://www.eff.org/share/compensation.php (summarizing various proposals). This is not
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Professor Neil Netanel suggests allowing consumers to engage in
unrestricted noncommercial use, adaptation, and peer-to-peer
exchange of all types of communicative expression, and imposing a
noncommercial use levy to compensate copyright owners. Netanel
would impose the levy on the sale of products and services whose
value is enhanced by peer-to-peer file sharing. Organizations
representing copyright owners would divide the levy proceeds among
their members using both sampling and digital tracking
technologies."' Professor Terry Fisher proposes a slightly different
solution. Fisher would encourage copyright owners of music
recordings and films to register their works with the Copyright Office,
which would assign every registered music recording or film a unique
registration number. Copyright owners would incorporate the
registration numbers into the names of the digital files containing the
registered works. The Copyright Office would be responsible for
administering a tax on digital recording devices, digital storage media
and Internet access services, and would divide the proceeds of the tax
among owners of the copyright in registered works by tracking
downloads of files by registration number and using sampling to
estimate offline consumption. Anyone would be permitted to
reproduce, distribute or perform audio and video recordings over the
Internet. Professor Fisher suggests that the initial deployment of his
proposal be completely voluntary, but he envisions that it would
26
ultimately replace the current copyright law.
Professor Raymond Ku argues that the current copyright law
makes no sense in the context of digital distribution. Ku would retain
the current law for analog distribution, but would replace copyright in
the Internet context with a privilege allowing consumers to engage in
noncommercial online distribution. If the revenue from analog
sources proved insufficient to support the creation and distribution of
music, Ku recommends the enactment of a statute imposing levies on
sales of Internet service and on computer, audio, and video

the first time such proposals have been made; Richard Stallman made a similar proposal
more than a decade ago. See Richard Stallman, Copywrong, WIRED 1.03 (July 1993), at
www.wired.com/wired/archive/1.03/1.3-stallman.copyright.html (proposing a tax in return
for unrestricted digital copying). What is surprising is the growing consensus supporting
payment or licensing systems designed to compensate copyright owners in return for
legalizing consumer digital copying.
125. See Netanel, supra note 121, at 35-59.
126. See Fisher, supra note 121, at 9-10, 199-258.
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equipment. 2 7 Professor Glynn Lunny argues that private digital
copying probably does more good than harm, but suggests that if that
harm must be redressed, a levy imposed on devices and blank storage
media is the best available solution.128 Professor Daniel Gervais,
analyzing the problem from the Canadian vantage point, where a
court has recently concluded that peer-to-peer file sharing is often
lawful, 29 suggests modifying existing collective licensing to extend to
peer-to-peer file trading. 30 Professor Larry Lessig has weighed in with
a modified version of Fisher's proposal, designed to compensate
copyright owners temporarily until ubiquitous licensed music
streaming replaces peer-to-peer file sharing as consumers' preferred
means of gaining access to music.13 The Electronic Frontier
Foundation recently suggested that the best solution would be for the
music industry simply to agree to offer music fans a license to engage
32
in file sharing for a small monthly fee.
The music industry's response to all of these proposals 33 has
been chilly. Despite a spirited recent defense of the recording
127. See Ku, supra note 109, at 311-24. Ku suggests such a license as a last resort only if
revenue from the sales of albums augmented by voluntary "tipping" should prove
insufficient.
128. Lunney, supra note 109, at 911-20.
129. See BMG Canada v. Doe [2004] F.C. 88 (Can.)
130. Daniel J. Gervais, Copyright,Money and the Internet (March 3, 2004), available at
http://www.commonlaw.uottawa.ca/faculty/prof/dgervais/
CopyrightMoneyAndTheInternet.pdf.
131. See Lessig, supra note 51, at 300-04.
132. Electronic Frontier Foundation, A Better Way Forward: Voluntary Collective
Licensing of Music File Sharing (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.eff.org/share/
collectivelic-wp.pdf.
133. The differences between these proposals are not, in fact, that large. Netanel's
plan would permit unrestricted noncommercial use of most copyrighted material, see
Netanel, supra note 121, at 37-43, while Fisher limits his proposal to audio and video
recordings, but would allow commercial as well as noncommercial uses. See Fisher, supra
note 121, at 203-05, 234-36. Lessig believes that P2P will become less desirable once
enhanced Internet access makes ubiquitous licensed streaming an attractive alternative,
and would therefore make the system a temporary stopgap. See LESSIG, supra note 51 at
297-303. Netanel, Fisher, Gervais and Lessig would direct their alternative compensation
to copyright owners, while Ku would reserve it for musicians and songwriters. Netanel,
Fisher and Ku all, however, rely on a government-imposed, Copyright Officeadministered fee on the sale of digital goods and services to provide compensation for
missed sales and royalties. Netanel would leave the current copyright law untouched
except for his noncommercial user privilege and levy. See Netanel, supra note 121, at 3759. Ku would retain the current law for analog distribution so long as works were
distributed in the analog as well as the digital channel. Ku, supra note 109, at 321-24.
Fisher envisions his system's ultimately superseding the current statutory copyright.
Fisher, supra note 121, at 9-10, 246-51. Despite these differences, however, the core of all
of the proposals is to permit, indeed encourage, consumers to engage in consumer-to-
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industry's need to rely on the copyright compulsory license crafted for
its benefit, " a recording industry spokesman explained that any
compulsory license benefiting the public would be unacceptable
because it would involve the government in setting the price for
music. 35 Voluntary collective licensing, he insisted, would either be
unfair because the few consumers who participated would subsidize
the many who continued to rely on free downloads, or it would be

voluntary only in name.1 36 Instead, the recording industry, which has
recently licensed services that permit consumers to buy the
opportunity to listen to or download music recorded in copyprotected digital files, claims that if peer-to-peer file sharing services
would simply prevent any exchange of unlicensed content, copyright
owners would have an opportunity to sell consumers the music they

want. 137 The market can work only if the recording industry doesn't
have to compete with free.

At its best, though, letting the market work promises to
perpetuate and extend the already vexing problems that have
engendered today's music environment, in which rights are difficult or
impossible to clear and the majority of creators go unpaid. Nothing in
the music and recording industry's promises suggests that they have
an interest in solving these problems, much less a plan to do so.
Instead, the recording and music industry seem determined to
consumer distribution while compensating creators from a fund financed by the sales of
related equipment and services. Gervais and the Electronic Frontier Foundation rely on
similar mechanisms but argue that rights holders should adopt the mechanisms voluntarily
and administer them collectively rather than relying on government-administered
licensing. As a practical matter, the adoption of any compulsory license would require the
endorsement of music and recording industry copyright owners. The differences between
the compulsory license proposals and the voluntary collective license proposals are, thus,
more formal than fundamental.
134. Section 115 of the Copyright Act: In Need of Update?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On Courts and Intellectual Property of the House JudiciaryComm., 108th Cong.
(statement of RIAA President Cary H. Sherman), available at
(2004)
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/sherman03l104.htm.
135. Lindsay Martell, A License to Share: Group ProposesMusic Licensing Scheme for
Music File Networks, ABCNews.com, March 1, 2004, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/
(quoting RIAA Vice
scitech/TechTV/music-downloadlicensetechtv_040301.html
President David Sutphen: "I don't want the federal government deciding the value of
things like music.").
136. See id.; Drew Clark, Intellectual Property: Music Software Officials Debate Merits
of Licenses, Filters, National Journal's Technology Daily, (Feb. 27, 2004), (available on
LEXIS); EFFVoluntary License Plan Brings RIAA 'Thanks But No Thanks,' Washington
Internet Daily, Feb. 26,2004.
PC
137. See, e.g., Tom Spring, Three Minutes with RIAA Chief Cary Sherman,
3 00
WORLD, Oct. 30, 2003, at http://yahoo.pcworld.com/yahoo/article/0,aid,11313 , .asp;
sources cited supra notes 131-133.
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exacerbate the difficulties imposed by a multiplicity of conflicting
rights holders, by imposing obligations on hardware manufacturers,
software publishers and Internet access services to implement a
variety of maddening digital rights management formats and

incompatible files and devices.138 Surely we can do better. Adopting

solutions designed to support the current music market structure, and
export its anomalies to a digital marketplace, saddles us with
undesirable and unnecessary artifacts that arose from problems
particular to conventional distribution. Under our current system,
immensely talented and hard working composers and musicians, who
create great stuff that people would want to buy if they knew about it,
are often unable to make a living making music, because the system
we rely on to encourage the creation and dissemination of music
works best when its products are scarce. As a necessary corollary of a
distribution mechanism that requires significant investment of capital
in order to deliver music to consumers, that fact may be a regrettable
but a reasonable sacrifice at the altar of great music. Extending the
lottery-like nature of today's conventional music market to a digital
world, though, where maintaining scarcity is more expensive than
tolerating ubiquity, is profoundly dysfunctional.
From the viewpoint of the individuals who make the music,
moreover, the reform proposals to legitimize peer-to-peer file sharing
rely on mechanisms that are remarkably similar to the devices we rely
on today to pay money to composers and musicians. 39 In Canada,

138. See Roy Mark, RIAA v. P2P: Same Old Song, InternetNews.com, Feb. 27, 2004,
at http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/3318901.
139. Considered in the context of music, the changes envisioned by proponents of
blanket licensing for peer-to-peer file sharing are hardly extreme. Consumers already have
a privilege to make non-commercial digital copies of musical recordings, and the right to
distribute those copies to members of the public. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1008, 109 (2000). The
scope of the copying privilege is contested. The statute prohibits copyright infringement
actions "based on the manufacture, importation, or distribution of a digital audio
recording device, a digital audio recording medium, an analog recording device, or an
analog recording medium, or based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of such a
device or medium for making digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings." Id.
Digital musical recordings are defined to exclude material objects "in which one or more
computer programs are fixed." Id. § 1001. That has led some to argue and at least one
court to conclude that section 1008 shields noncommercial recordings burned to music
CDs (on which a royalty has been paid), or recorded on analog or digital audiotape, but
excludes recordings saved to a computer hard disk. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001). See also Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond
Multimedia Sys, 180 F.3d 1072, 1076-81 (9th Cir. 1999)(computers are not "digital audio
recording devices" within the meaning of the statute). Under 17 U.S.C. § 109, "the owner
of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title ... is entitled, without
the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that
copy or phonorecord." So long as the copy is made lawfully, whether under the fair use
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Europe and Japan, musicians and composers rely heavily on
collecting societies.' ° In the United States, a patchwork combination

143
2
of compulsory licenses,"' blanket licenses,' standard trade practices

and rate courts'" add up to much the same thing. The proposals to
enact a new license to permit peer-to-peer file sharing and
compensate creators through a levy, tax, or uniform royalty have

inspired heated philosophical and economic debates over the flaws in

any compulsory or collective licensing system.'45 The objections tend
to ignore the fact that to the extent that composers and performers

currently earn income from the sale and performance of recorded
music, they collect most of that income through a combination of
standardized, compulsory and collective licenses administered by

intermediaries (music publishers, record companies, performing
rights societies) in return for payment. From the vantage point of
music creators, replacing the theoretical control they enjoy under the
copyright law with an enforceable promise of payment makes them
no worse off, and makes most of them better off.
The intermediaries who hold control over musical works and

recordings are also in it for the money, and one might expect them to
be delighted to hand over their control in return for more cash. Not a

privilege or under the section 1008 shelter for consumers' noncommercial copies of music
recordings, the owner of the copy is entitled to sell it or give it away. Accord M. Nimmer
& D. Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §8.12 [BI[3][c]; U.S. Copyright Office, Report of
the Register of Copyrights Pursuant to § 104 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 155157 (2001). Consumers, moreover, already pay a levy intended to compensate composers,
musicians and record companies for the sales lost through private consumer copying. See
17 U.S.C. §§ 1003, 1004 (2002). Netanel, Fisher, Lunney and Ku would extend both the
privilege and the levy to copying and dissemination over digital networks.
140. See Daniel Gervais, Application of an Extended Collective Licensing Regime in
Canada:Principlesand Issues Related to Implementation (2003); Daniel Gervais, Collective
Management of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights in Canada: An International
Perspective, 1 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 21-50 (2002).
141. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 112(e), 114(d), 115, 118,119 (2000).
142. See Broadcast Music Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 4-14 (1979).
143.

See, e.g., DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC

BUSINESS 70-79, 210-22 (5th ed. 2003)
144. See U.S. v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 316 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003); U.S. v. ASCAP, 902
F. Supp. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
145. See, e.g., Music on The Internet: Hearing Before the House Judiciary Comm.
Subcomm. On Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, 107th Cong. 2-3 (2001)
(statement of Rep. Howard Berman), availableat http://www.house.gov
/judiciaryl72613.pdf; id. at 17-18 (statement of the National Music Publishers Association);
id. at 52 (statement of Lyle Lovett, ASCAP); Rachna Dhamija & Frederik Wallenberg, A
Management Proposals, at
Rights
Evaluating Digital
Framework for
http://sims.berkeley.edu/-fredrik/research/papers/EvaluatingDRM.html.
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bit of it.1" 6 The current dominant forces in the music and recording
business may no longer need record pressing plants, CD stamping
plants, warehouses and trucks to distribute music, but. they have a
huge stake in ensuring that digital distributors be limited to those who
used to rely on record pressing plants, CD stamping plants,
warehouses and trucks. The rest of us, however, don't share that
stake. Indeed, new distributors who never assumed those expenses
may be in a position to experiment with new variations on digital
distribution and still pay a larger percentage of proceeds to the
creators of the material.
The proposals advanced by Netanel, Fisher, Ku, Lunney, Gervais
and Lessig would improve the law by allowing frictionless, consumerto-consumer dissemination, and collecting royalties to compensate
creators from those who in a broad sense may be described as
commercially exploiting copyrighted works.'47 Moreover, when their
schemes are limited to music, currently the most vexing case of
consumer-to-consumer dissemination, the proposals are modest
extensions of devices contained in current law and business practice.
In drawing on their analyses, I end up suggesting a variant solution
pegged at least initially only to music sharing, but my pursuit of some
different choices shouldn't obscure the importance of their work. The
politics of copyright legislation will likely prevent us from adopting
any of the proposals they advance, but our copyright law would be
much improved if we did.

146.

See Jon Healy, New Napster to Play by Music Industry's Rules, LOS ANGELES

TIMES-MIRROR, Oct. 7, 2003, at Cl; Martin LaMonica, Debating Digital Media's Future,

cinet News.com, at http://news.com.com/2100-1025-5079007.html. (Sept. 18, 2003).
147. See LITMAN, supra note 1, at 178-86; Loren, supra note 68, at 716-19.

2 fl41

SHARING AND STEALING

V. Sharing and Hoarding
How violent is next week's episode of Dragonball Z?'4

If I'm persuaded that politics would prevent the adoption of the

sort of peer-to-peer licensing solutions scholars have proposed, why

am I bothering to articulate my own variation?14 9 As consensus builds
around the idea of paid peer-to-peer, it seems increasingly plausible

that some legislation will emerge with enough support from the
music, recording, computer, and consumer electronic industries to
have a fair chance of enactment. I expect that that legislation will
include both consumer downloads of music and collective licenses to
pay for them. Such a bill is less likely to resemble the proposals

advanced by Netanel, Fisher, Lunney, Ku, Gervais, or Lessig,
however, than it is to be designed to maintain the current recording
and music industry distributors in their market dominant position.
Most importantly, it is less likely to incorporate a privilege for
consumer-to-consumer dissemination than it is to include measures
designed to prevent it. If we are willing to give up consumer-to-

consumer dissemination in return for the instant gratification of
licensed direct downloads, the recording industry is probably willing

to sell us copy-protected files replicating much of the music it makes
available in stores.
The prospect of downloading copy-protected versions of music
otherwise available in stores is not particularly enticing. This is the
music version of the online "Encyclopedia World," and we can do
148. See Molikidan Tunksuu, Dragonball Z a Titles and AirDates Guide, at
http://epguides.com/DragonballZ/. Dragonball Z is a violent and modestly homoerotic
product of Japanese animation derived from a manga (comic book) authored by Akira
Toriyama. The original manga and animated series appear to have been intended for an
audience of grownups, but Funimation has edited them to make them more nearly suitable
for children and licensed them to the Cartoon Network. See Usenet News Groups,
alt.fan.dragonball, at http://groups.google.com/groups?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTFand Usenet News Groups, alt.fan.dragonball, at
8&group=alt.fan.dragonball,
http://groups.google.com/groups?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF8&group=alt.fan.
dragonball.us. The original manga have been translated into English and published by Viz
Communications; the original Japanese television episodes can be viewed (in Japanese) on
the International cable channel.
149. In 1995, I published an article suggesting that copyright law should be
reformulated as an exclusive right to exploit works commercially. See Jessica Litman,
Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 40-48 (1995). If that
proposal were adopted, consumers would be free to engage in peer-to-peer file sharing,
while commercial peer-to-peer file sharing software and services would face liability. That
result seems to accord with many people's instincts about what makes sense. I don't mean
by offering this reform plan to repudiate that proposal, which I continue to support. See
LITMAN, supra note 1, at 180-85.
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better. The promise of being able to find music that is not available in
stores, and to share it with other consumers, in contrast, is
compelling. Lots of music is not available in any store, because it's
old, it's obscure, it has little commercial potential, or the rights can't
be cleared without a statutory license or privilege because it's just too
difficult to figure out who owns them. Consumer-to-consumer music
dissemination makes it possible to find and share that music.
The fact that more than sixty million consumers are currently
exchanging music over peer-to-peer networks in the U.S. gives them a
stake in the building consensus, and a political claim to a seat at the
copyright bargaining table as well as a moral one. The details of any
proposal for an online music system will determine the extent to
which it promotes unfettered consumer-to-consumer exchange,
allows untethered consumer use, encourages the broad dissemination
of a wide variety of music of disparate types, takes advantage of the
economies made possible by digital distribution, and pays composers
and musicians. The details of such a system will also determine
whether and to what extent it requires copyright police to enforce its
rules. The more conversations that people who are not copyright
lobbyists can have about the details of a revised copyright bargain,
the better positioned they will be to shape the law Congress may
enact. 5 ° The devil will be in the details, and focusing on the details
allows us to figure out which ones are most important.
I suggest that we should try to build a music space that resembles
the current digital information space in the ubiquity of music it
contains and the ease with which music may be shared, and that we
should devise a combination of blanket fees or levies designed to
compensate the creators of the music we exchange. In order to
achieve the breadth and diversity of music (and the community of
consumers who enjoy it) that has evolved in the Internet information
space, we will need to rely on consumer-to-consumer dissemination as
well as licensed downloads or streams. If we as consumers want to
pay for the music we exchange, we need some form of blanket fee or
levy to enable us to do so. Because some creators and copyright
owners find the idea of consumer-to-consumer dissemination
unacceptable, I suggest that we devise a way to allow them to
withhold their music from the system. To discourage them from
electing that option, I believe we should optimize the legal
infrastructure for sharing. I've drawn the details of that infrastructure
150. See Jessica Litman, Ethical Disobedience, 5 ETHiCs AND INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY 217 (2003).
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with an eye toward recapturing some of the lost advantages of notice
and indivisibility.
So, should I have a drink with that guy or not?...
One important goal of online music copyright reform, I would
argue, should be to encourage music file sharing, as distinguished
from merely tolerating it. To do that, it should incorporate some
licensing mechanism that can cut through the thicket of overlapping
and conflicting rights. In addition, the legal defaults of such a system
need to be reset to "share" rather than "hoard." So long as shareable
is the legal default, we don't need to make sharing compulsory. We
can allow creators who would like to prevent their music from being
shared to make that election, without encouraging them to do so. The
system should allow consumers, computers and software to ascertain,
easily, whether music is hoarded or shareable, and thus encourage the
design of computer software allowing the sharing of shareable music
while making it difficult to share hoarded music. Another equally
important goal is to generate and actually distribute payments to the
creators of music. Moreover, music copyright reform should be cast
so as to avoid unnecessarily entrenching the intermediaries who
dominate the current bricks-and-mortar distribution system, and
should provide opportunities for the generation of new digital
intermediaries who can explore different ways of adding value to
music and promoting it to its audience. Finally, a reform proposal
should in the best of worlds accomplish all of this without abrogating
any international copyright treaties.
With those goals to guide us, we can envision a legal architecture
that would encourage but not compel copyright owners to make their
works available for widespread sharing over digital networks.
Although a variety of different licensing mechanisms would be
suitable, I favor a blanket license that would be both statutory and
voluntary. By statutory, I mean that the copyright law would
prescribe the terms and conditions of the license. By voluntary, I
mean that the law would provide an opportunity to designate works
as ineligible for the blanket license. Critics of compulsory license
proposals have complained about government involvement in music
price regulation, and suggested that collective licensing using a
151. See Randy Cohen, The Ethicist: Is it Ethical to Google After a Blind Date?, N.Y.
TIMES MAGAZINE, Dec. 15, 2002, at 50; Neil Swidery, A Nation of Voyeurs: How the
Internet Search Engine Google is Changing What We Can Find Out About One AnotherAnd Raising Questions About Whether We Should, BOSTON GLOBE MAGAZINE, Feb. 2,
2003, at 10.
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copyright owner member organization, rather than the government,
152
to collect and disburse royalties would be a superior alternative.

Our experience of collective licensing, however, indicates that royalty
collectives may sometimes be better at collecting money than
disbursing it. A government agency that requires transparency from
designated licensing agents and that can serve as the collection and
disbursement agent of last resort for creators who designate no agent
to represent them seems likely to encourage prospective licensing

agents to compete in the representation they offer, and may diminish
the possibility that any funds will be consumed by administrative and
legal expenses before they can be allocated to claimants."'
We should build the statutory license around a payment

mechanism

designed to

compensate

creators and

to

bypass

unnecessary intermediaries.1" That mechanism should have sufficient
flexibility to allow current and new upstart intermediaries to devise
useful value-added flavors of intermediation and collect dollars

accordingly. The most straightforward route to accomplish that would
be to assign the right to collect the proceeds of the license directly to
the individual creators of music rather than their intermediaries, but
without relieving them of any contractual obligations they may have
assumed to pass some portion of their receipts to others. Where
extant contracts speak directly to the division of royalties for
consumer-to-consumer digital dissemination, the contracts will
doubtless control. Where contracts are unclear or lost, the creators
and their intermediaries will need to work things out. Creators who
don't wish to act as their own collection agents should be encouraged
to designate agents to collect and disburse funds on their behalves.

152. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Compulsory Licensing vs. the Three "Golden Oldies"
Property, Contract Rights and Markets, CATO Institute Policy Analysis No 508, at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa508.pdf (Jan. 15, 2004); sources cited supra notes 135-137.
153. The current debates over proposals for alternative compensation systems have
tended to devolve into religious disagreements over whether dividing the money up
among claimants requires counting every download, as Fisher's system would, or relying
on a less precise measure in order to preserve the privacy of downloaders, as Gervais and
others suggest. Counting every download poses problems other than privacy. It makes
little sense to require a measuring system that is so expensive that it consumes the bulk of
the proceeds. As an initial matter, the law should instruct the government entity charged
with disbursing the funds in very general terms, to ensure the money is distributed fairly
among creators. Fine tuning, if it proves necessary, can come later.
154. Here I part company from both Netanel and Fisher, who insist that compensation
under their proposed alternatives should flow to the copyright owners rather than to the
creators of works. Netanel suggests that, under his system, empowered creators will no
longer need to rely on intermediaries and will increasingly retain copyright ownership. See
Netanel, supra note 121, at 58-59. I'm skeptical.
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Where a composer or performer prefers to eschew representation,
however, she should be able to collect her share of any fund from the
government entity that will collect and disburse the money.
In the first instance, money should be disbursed to the musicians
and composers who author music and recordings.155 If musicians and
composers have assigned their copyrights to intermediaries, they
would be obliged to pass along their assignees' share of that money
under whatever terms their contracts set.16 There is value nonetheless
in choosing to distribute the money directly to the creators. First,
where contracts do not assign the copyright in its entirety and fail to
speak to the rights to collect royalties for consumer-to-consumer
digital dissemination, the question whether particular intermediaries
have contractual rights to a portion of the fees will depend on the
language of the particular contracts. If intermediaries are optional
contributors to digital dissemination, it seems counterproductive to
presume that they must have persuaded creative contributors to
assign them any rights that would ever become remunerative. Where
particular contracts don't seem to say, or simply cannot be found, the
creators of the music ought to be able to keep the payments, or to
find different intermediaries who may be able to administer digital
rights without the inertia of bookkeeping tricks that became
customary fifty or more years ago.157 Second, directing the payments
to authors and performers addresses a problem that has plagued the
administration of extant compulsory licenses in the United States.
The system for managing those licenses was designed by large, wellfinanced and legally sophisticated stakeholders, with large, wellfinanced and legally sophisticated stakeholders in mind, and has
systematically disadvantaged stakeholders who are small,
independent or poorly organized. The price of a ticket to a Copyright
Arbitration Royalty Panel proceeding is beyond the means of all but
the wealthiest interest groups.'5 8 Why not design the system so that
155. As well as encouraging creators to designate agents to collect on their behalves,
we should permit them to designate percentages of any proceeds that should be disbursed
directly to intermediaries under whatever contracts might call for a royalty split.
156. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(1) (2000) (providing that recording artists are entitled to
receive payments from copyright owners for licensed webcasts in accordance with the
terms of their recording contracts).
157. See generally PASSMAN, supra note 143, at 72-77, 208-235.
158. See Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) Structure and Process: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. On Court, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the House
Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. (2002), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/
80194.pdf (statement of MaryBeth Peters, Register of Copyrights); id at 150-51 (letter
from Hilary Rosen, RIAA); id. at 167 (letter from Kevin Klose, National Public Radio).
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individuals can actually use it? Finally, directing the payments to
composers and musicians will pose an opportunity for new flavors of
intermediary interested in providing a different package of services in
return for a different percentage of receipts. Those intermediaries
may introduce new value-added enhancements to digital distribution.
There are two extant models for collecting the fees to be divided
among creators: the first model is a direct blanket license fee of the
sort collected by performing rights organizations such as ASCAP.
Subscribers wishing to engage in peer-to-peer file sharing would pay a
premium that would absolve them from liability for infringement. The
Electronic Frontier Foundation proposal for voluntary collective
licensing endorses this model. 9 The second model is to impose a levy
or tax on the sale of goods or services that are most directly involved
in peer-to-peer file trading. Professors Netanel and Fisher, among
others, base their proposals on this model.'6 The United States
copyright statute includes examples following both models, 6' as do
the copyright laws of our trading partners." The levy or tax approach
has the dual advantages of fairness 63 and relative ease of
administration-it can be imposed on commercial activities that earn
money from peer-to-peer file sharing without inflicting significant
burdens on consumers. That strength may be its most important
disadvantage: to the extent that license fees "feel free" to consumers
they may conclude that paying creators for music is unnecessary or
unimportant. Whichever model we adopt, though, we need to
remember that the consumers who are engaging in this behavior are
providing the valuable services that in the bricks-and-mortar world
159.

See EFF, A Better Way Forward,supranote 132, at http://www.eff.org/share/

collectivelic.wp.php.

160.

See FISHER, supra note 121, at 205-23; Netanel, supra note 121, at 35-84.

161.

See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(d)(1)(B) (1976) (cable compulsory license semiannual

royalty calculated as a percentage of gross receipts); 115(c) (mechanical compulsory
license monthly royalty computed by number of phonorecords made and distributed);
1004 (digital audio recording device royalty calculated as percentage of wholesale price of

each device).
162.

See, e.g., Copyright Act, (1985) (Can.) § 66 (collective license royalty for public

performance); § 82 (levy on blank audio recording media).
163. See FISHER, supra note 121, at 216-23. It makes sense to impose a fee on the
commercial activities and objects most heavily involved in peer-to-peer music file trading.
I include in this category commercial peer-to-peer file trading software, whether sold or
advertising-supported. I'd personally also include the hardware and software that allows
people to use their computers as home entertainment centers, especially those bundled

into a computer by original equipment manufacturers: computer sound cards, computer
speakers and software for CD ripping and music playing. It may make sense to collect a
fee on broadband access, either as a broadband tax or a quasi-negotiated broadband peerto-peer subscription fee.

20041

SHARING AND STEALING

are provided by CD stamping plants, warehouses, trucks, record
stores, and radio broadcasters, and they should be compensated

accordingly. ' 6 The fees consumers pay to engage in file trading don't
need to replace the income of the intermediaries they're replacing,

and I think those fees shouldn't be large.
If the legal architecture encourages sharing but permits what we

might want to call "hoarding," then consumer-to-consumer exchange
can develop without difficult legal or technological barriers."' Thus,
I'd be willing to incorporate a limited, carefully structured, noticebased opt out for copyright owners who prefer control to payment. If
hoarded music is indeed superior, it will be able to compete with the
"free" stuff. (If it can't compete with the "free" stuff, then overall
welfare is probably enhanced if we refuse to subsidize it with
expensive legal barriers and copyright police.) To achieve a legal
regime that encourages sharing but permits hoarding, we should
impose a requirement that copyright owners who decide to hoard
must forgo any payment for hoarded works from the common
payment system, and must take affirmative but relatively modest
steps to exclude their works from the network and enable consumers
to quickly and painlessly ascertain that those works may not lawfully
be shared.
My reasons for preferring a system that copyright owners can
choose not to participate in are at least in part pragmatic. First, so
long as the legal and technological architecture are optimized for
sharing, allowing copyright owners to withhold their works does little
harm. Paid subscription information and news sites on the Internet
coexist comfortably with sites that are open to the public and free of
charge; if we can duplicate that peaceful coexistence for digital music,
it seems sensible to try to do so. Second, if we design an alternative
compensation system to collect enough money to compensate the
proprietors of mega-hits for all of their forgone income, we can
expect that the expense of such a system will be unreasonably high,
and that the compensation paid to the creators of more modestly
successful music will be unreasonably low. Third, if such a system
allows copyright owners to decline to participate, it seems more likely
that it will be deemed at least arguably compliant with our treaty
164. See Ku, supra note 109, at 300-05.
165. I believe that in general outline, this solution is appropriate for copyrighted works
other than music. Cf. LITMAN, supra note 1, at 180-86 (outlining alternative to current
copyright law). I focus on music here because the differences between my proposal and
current law are narrowest in the music context, and because the peer-to-peer file sharing
of music recordings is perceived to be the current emergency facing copyright legislators.
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obligations under the Berne Convention and the WIPO Copyright
Treaty.166 Finally, my proposal is motivated in part by my conviction
that composers and musicians have been ill-served by the current
system. If they nonetheless prefer the dysfunction they know to a new
and unproved system, and we can make the system work without
including them, I see no important policies that will be served by
forcing them to participate. At the same time, it makes little sense to
allow copyright owners to opt out too easily. A key element of my
proposal relies on consumer willingness to pay a blanket license fee to
share some but not all music. I believe that consumers will be willing
to pay a blanket license fee if it seems clear that they are buying
something of appropriate value. The value of the system would
diminish significantly if the list of unshareable music were so long it
became burdensome to check it.
To enable an opt-out mechanism that won't deform the legal and
technical architecture encouraging sharing, I suggest that we try to
reproduce the functions that notice and indivisibility provided before
we abandoned them. 16 7 Consumers should be able to rely on an
assumption that musical works may be shared unless copies of the
works indicate otherwise in some fashion that can be read by both
consumers and their computers. The key to the opt-out mechanism I
propose is the selection of a single digital file format or family of
formats capable of conveying copyright management information as
defined in section 1202 of the copyright act. 68 The format will

166. Although desirable, the proposal's Berne-compatibility is optional. We could
comply with our treaty obligations by limiting the application of any provision to "United
States works" as defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101. United States works include all works first
published in the U.S. Cf. Public Domain Enhancement Act, H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. § 3
(2003) (limiting the bill's provisions to "United States works"). The Berne Convention
obliges us to protect the copyrights of members of Berne nations without requiring any
formalities.
167. To the extent possible, we should do this without further undermining the United
States' debatable position that it complies with the Berne Convention. Our argument that
US law protected droit moral, always dubious, seems even less tenable after DastarCorp.
v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, (2003). After Dastar it is difficult to
make a credible argument that the United States complies with our obligations under
article 6 bis of the treaty. The WTO, further, has ruled that 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2000)
violates our treaty obligations under articles 11, 11 bis, and 13 of Berne. See International
Developments, 23 No. 6 ENT. L. REP. 4 (2001); WTO, Award of the Arbitrators in United
States-Section 110(5) of the US CopyrightAct, at http://www.wto.orglenglish/tratop_e/
dispu-e/160arb 25-1.e.pdf.
168. See 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000):
"copyright management information" means any of the following information
conveyed in connection with copies or phonorecords of a work or performances
or displays of a work, including in digital form, except that such term does not

20041

SHARING AND STEALING

probably incorporate digital rights management capability because
the people who will be using it will desire that feature, but there's no

need for any copy-protection to be hack-proof, or even exceptionally
durable. To the extent feasible, the new format should be compatible
with the current generation of digital playback devices.169 I'll call the

format "*.drm" for short.7 Any musical work or sound recording that
is made available to the public, under the copyright owner's authority,
only in *.drm format will be ineligible for sharing or compensation. 7 '

At such time as the creators or copyright owners of a work desire to
participate in the revenue earned from digital sharing, they may
publish the work in other formats and become eligible to collect

compensation.
include any personally identifying information about a user of a work or of a
copy, phonorecord, performance, or display of a work:
(1) The title and other information identifying the work, including the
information set forth on a notice of copyright.
(2) The name of, and other identifying information about, the author of a
work.
(3) The name of, and other identifying information about, the copyright
owner of the work, including the information set forth in a notice of
copyright.
(4) With the exception of public performances of works by radio and
television broadcast stations, the name of, and other identifying information
about, a performer whose performance is fixed in a work other than an
audiovisual work.
(5) With the exception of public performances of works by radio and
television broadcast stations, in the case of an audiovisual work, the name
of, and other identifying information about, a writer, performer, or director
who is credited in the audiovisual work.
(6) Terms and conditions for use of the work.
(7) Identifying numbers or symbols referring to such information or links to
such information.
(8) Such other information as the Register of Copyrights may prescribe by
regulation, except that the Register of Copyrights may not require the
provision of any information concerning the user of a copyrighted work.
169. I've been unable to get a definitive answer to my question whether any extant file
format (for example, one of the formats generated by the now moribund Secure Digital
Music Initiative, see http://www.sdmi.org), would fit the bill, or whether a new format
would need to be designed. The chief difficulty in adopting any of the proprietary formats
now in use seems to be in ensuring backward-compatibility with legacy CD players.
170. Naming the format "*.drm" burdens it with baggage from the debate over the
propriety of digital lock-up. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 575 (2003); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and Creative Destruction: Fair
Use Beyond Market Failure, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 539 (2003). My preference would
have been to name the format *.cmi, but "cmi" has a settled inconsistent meaning.
171. Implementing the proposal would require an amendment to the mechanical
compulsory license provisions in 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000). As amended, section 115 would
need to require any recording of a work issued only in *.drm format to itself be in *.drm
format. See Loren, supra note 68.
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What about the works being traded on peer-to-peer networks
today'? The system can incorporate an opportunity to withdraw works
from sharing, but in fairness to consumers, the process for
withdrawing a work should be significantly more difficult than the
initial choice to withhold it. 172 (Frankly, I'd prefer it if it were
sufficiently onerous to withdraw a work from the shareable realm that
it would almost never make economic sense to pursue it. Some works
will doubtless be hoarded for non-economic reasons, 173 but we
shouldn't encourage it.) Moreover, discouraging consumers from
trading hoarded music requires that they believe the division between
shared and hoarded is a reasonable one. If consumers understand that
hoarding applies to new works and not the stuff on their hard disks,
they're more likely to go along.
For all works that have been released in any format other than
*.drm, then, the law should adopt a presumption of shareability.
Copyright owners may avail themselves of an opportunity to
withdraw works that have already been made available to the public,
but the terms of that opportunity should be sufficiently burdensome
that they don't lightly undertake to withdraw a work. I'd suggest that
withdrawing a work would require the copyright owner to take the
following steps: All owners of the copyright in the work, as well as the
work's creators, would be required to join in the decision to
withdraw. 174 First, the copyright owners would need to recall copies of
the work released in formats other than *.drm, 175 and offer any
consumers who own authorized, commercial copies in a non-*.drm
format the opportunity to swap those copies for *.drm copies at no
charge. Second, the law should incorporate a 24-month grace period
before any withdrawal of a work could take effect. 176 (In the
meantime, withdrawn works could collect payments from the
common fund.) Finally, in order to recover in an infringement suit for
consumer-to-consumer dissemination of a withdrawn work, the
copyright owner would need to show knowledge that the work had
77
been withdrawn.
172. If, as some claim, the recording and music industries are intent on protecting their
hot new hits from peer-to-peer networking but are resigned to the traffic in unauthorized
copies of older releases, that feature should not be too bitter to swallow.
173. I would, for example, expect composers and performers to want to consider
withdrawing works upon terminating copyright transfers under section 203 or 304.
174. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2000).
175. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 405 (a)(2) (2000).
176. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 104 (2000).
177. Despite the Berne Convention's prohibition of formalities, it should be possible
to establish an optional registry of withdrawn works, and provide that listing of a work on
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Whatever happened to Herman's Hermits?7.
With the exception of works released only in *.drm format,
any reproduction,
dissemination and
consumer-to-consumer
distribution or public performance or display that it entailed, would
be completely legal. Any music that's already been released in other
formats could be recaptured only with great difficulty, so the
overwhelming majority of music currently being shared over peer-topeer networks would not be locked back up. It would, however, be
eligible for compensation. Creators of new releases could choose to
make them available for sharing or they could hoard them and forgd
both the free distribution and the additional income that sharing
would generate.
Inevitably, some noncompliant consumer will seek to trade a
*.drm file over a peer-to-peer network. Copyright owners could sue,
as they do now, for copyright infringement. Notwithstanding that
record labels are currently pressing copyright infringement suits
against individual peer-to-peer file traders, why would they settle for
a system that gives them no more effective an enforcement
mechanism than the one they have now? My answer is that if
hoarding were reserved for new releases with significant commercial
potential, I believe that consumers would be far more likely to respect
the choice to hoard, and a law with broad consumer support is easier
to enforce than one that lacks it.179
The use of a single file format will enable consumers easily to
identify files they may not share and facilitate efforts of software
designers to create file sharing software that blocks transfers of
proprietary files. The use of a single, identified file format captures
some of the public benefits of copyright notice and registration. By
allowing copyright owners to opt out of file sharing so long and only
so long as their work remains published in the single *.drm format,
the proposal mitigates the effects of divisibility by requiring the
copyright owners to coordinate with one another in exploiting their
works.
My specific proposal is inspired by an impulse to see whether an
architecture like the one that has permitted the Internet to flourish as
the registry for 24 months would allow the copyright owner to show constructive notice of
withdrawal. Cf. 17 U.S.C. §§ 401, 408 (2000) If a voluntary registry is deemed to pose
Berne compliance problems, then copyright owners suing for infringement of withdrawn
works would need to prove actual notice.
178. See Guitarsam's Ezine, at http://www.guitarsam.com/ezine/2001.2/5.htm (Feb.
2001) (Peter Noone, the Herman of Herman's Hermits, performs to this day).
179. See LITMAN, supra note 1, at 111-121.
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an information space can define a thriving music space. The U.S.
recording industry's recent enforcement campaign seems to seek to
move us in a very different direction. It promises us something we
would all agree is desirable if we only renounce what to many of us is
crucial. The recording industry appears poised to accept a world in
which we agree to allow consumer downloading (for a price) but not
what the recording industry is calling "uploading"-which is the state
of having on your hard disk a music file that someone else can search
for and copy from you. Just as the idiosyncratic interests of large
numbers of individuals who want to share is directly responsible for
the wealth and incredible variety of information we can find when we
go looking for it, I think that consumer-to-consumer file trading has
the potential to make it economically feasible to distribute a much
broader variety of music to a much larger audience. I'd hate to lose
that potential just because it's strange, new, unproven, and not yet
well represented by lobbyists.

